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Large and bold acquisition attempts by emerging market firms (EMFs) have drawn the 
attention of the business press and academic research alike. EMFs are successfully venturing into 
industries that were previously dominated by select advanced market firms. In response, 
international business (IB) research has attempted to understand the capabilities, behaviors and 
motivations of emerging market firms. However, the general and specialized theories produced 
by this research are not sufficient to explain all EMF behaviors.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to present and test elements of an integrated theory 
addressing the current theoretical shortfalls. Specifically, I integrate three specialized theories 
with the OLI paradigm to explain the behavior of a larger set of EMFs. This integrated theory is 
based on the idea that EMFs are not monolithic, but are heterogeneous due to their distinct home 
country environments. That is, the state of home country institutional and resource environments 
create unique opportunities and constraints for EMFs. Thus, EMF investments towards advanced 
markets and specific behaviors are in response to their unique home country environments. The 
theory is presented and tested in two parts.  
Part 1, examines the influence of EMF home country institutional development and 
resource endowments on the scale of outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) directed 
towards advanced markets. Its findings suggest that the home country’s institutional 
development, factor market development, capital market development and technological 
readiness do indeed influence the volume of OFDI directed towards advanced markets by EMFs.  
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In part 2, I argue that home country institutional quality, factor market development and 
capital market development influence three forms of EMF behavior in advanced market firm 
acquisitions- ownership concentration, target valuation and risk mitigation. The analysis of 4,161 
EMF acquisitions in advanced markets largely supports the argument that the state of home 
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Focus and Importance of the Study 
In 1981, Antonine Van Agtmael coined the term “Emerging Markets” to replace the term 
“Third World Countries” to leave behind the stigma associated with the term and encourage 
investments into these underdeveloped markets. The term “Emerging Markets” was chosen to 
indicate “progress, uplift and dynamism” in these markets (Van Agtmael, 2007, p.5). And 
indeed, emerging markets have become centers for global investments in the last few decades 
(Sharma, 2012). Firms from emerging markets are also a growing force in the world economy in 
the 20
th
 century (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). Whereas emerging market firms (EMFs) accounted 
only for 5.6% of Global Fortune 500 firms in 1985, they now account for 30.2% of the Global 
Fortune 500 list in 2014. In addition, leading emerging market firms (EMFs) like Tata, Embraer, 
Huawei and Infosys are at the forefront of the economic news cycles and their aggressive and 
unique internationalization approaches have defied existing assumptions on emerging markets. 
Yet, it is difficult to explain the growing prominence of EMFs, because poor countries are 
expected to import capital, including foreign direct investment (FDI), rather than export it.  
While emerging markets are expected to go through years of inward FDI before 
becoming prosperous and competitive enough to produce multinational enterprises (MNEs) of 
their own (Dunning & Narula, 1997), emerging market firms are competing against traditional 
MNEs (advanced market multinationals) and are increasingly finding success in most markets 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Ramamurti, 2012). This is against the conventional wisdom 
because emerging markets while being poor and technologically backward, are producing MNEs 
and changing the global competitive landscape, and challenging the status quo of existing market 
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leaders from advanced markets. The question is how are emerging market firms achieving this 
significant success?  
In addition, international business theories predominantly developed to explain advanced 
market firms are inadequate. They do not provide an explanation on how emerging markets are 
spawning MNEs, why there is considerable internationalization of EMFs, nor what is the range 
of behaviors of EMFs. Specifically, early theories of internationalization, like the Product life 
cycle theory (Vernon, 1966, 1979) and Stages of internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977), not only fail to explain the internationalization of EMFs, but also suggest that EMFs are 
not expected to internationalize, and that they are internationalizing in the wrong direction. 
Consequently, the “OLI paradigm” (Dunning, 1988), the most significant and widely accepted 
theory in IB, also currently fails to explain the existence of EMNEs, and the internationalization 
behavior of EMFs.  
Given traditional IB theories do not adequately explain the existence of EMNEs and their 
unique internationalization behaviors, scholars have called for new theories to explain these 
unique EMF behaviors. Addressing this call, a new set of theories have been put forward arguing 
that “pull factors” (Fabian, Molina, & Labianca, 2009) can explain the behavior of EMNEs. For 
example, Luo and Tung’s (2007) “springboard perspective” suggests that EMNEs 
internationalize to seek ownership advantages, which they lack (Rugman, 2009). More 
specifically, Mathews’ (2006) “linkage, leverage and learning framework” argues that EMNEs 
internationalize using linkages to acquire strategic assets and ownership advantages from 
external sources; to leverage networks to connect to partners and obtain strategic advantages; 




Though these new theories have been well received, some researchers believe that they 
have little to offer and strongly advocate that prior theories can still explain EMF behavior (i.e., 
Dunning, Kim, & Park, 2008; Rugman, 2010). However, scholars like Cuervo- Cazurra (2012) 
and Ramamurti (2009, 2012) take a middle path and argue that EMFs provide a context to 
deepen our understanding and provide an opportunity to extend our existing theories. For 
example, Rugman (2009) suggests that the internationalization of EMFs is a result of the 
exploitation of their country-specific advantages like cheap labor and abundance of natural 
resources. Ramamurti (2009, 2012) argues that an entirely different set of ownership advantages 
possessed by EMFs, such as access to low cost, state-subsidized capital, can explain their 
existence and their atypical internationalization trajectories. And finally, Cuervo-Cazurra (2012) 
argues that country of origin effects explain EMF behavior.  
In an effort to contribute to this ongoing debate and expand our understanding of EMF 
internationalization trajectories and strategies, this research also adopts the middle ground 
perspective, specifically building on Cuervo-Cazurra’s (2012) argument of country of origin 
effects. The basic thesis driving this dissertation is that the heterogeneous nature of an EMFs’ 
home country institutional and resource environments explains the internationalization and 
specific investment behaviors of its EMFs. Thus, the research question I address in the sections 
that follow is: “How does the institutional and resource configuration of the home country 
influence EMF internationalization trajectories and internationalization strategies?”  
Approach to Address the Research Question 
This dissertation addresses the research question in two parts. Part 1 focuses on how a 
home country’s institutional and resource environment creates the necessity to develop market 
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and non-market capabilities. Secondly, it delineates under what conditions EMFs are driven 
towards advanced markets, as determined by the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.  
Part 2 focuses on how the home country’s institutional and resource factors determine the 
behavior of EMFs in their AMF acquisitions. Specifically, this part focuses on ownership 
concentration, target valuation and risk mitigation in EMF acquisitions. These proxies help 
understand the motivation of the EMF, and specific acquisition behaviors.  
This two-part approach addresses the research question in both a holistic, and a focused, 
manner.  
Purpose and Contributions of the Study 
 
The goal is to first identify the home country factors that explain the internationalization 
of EMFs to advanced markets, and second, to understand how and why the strategies and 
behaviors adapted by EMFs differ from their advanced market firm (AMF) counterparts. I argue 
that these internationalization trajectories and behaviors can be best explained by examining the 
effects of the EMF’s home country institutional and resource configuration. In the process, I 
attempt to extend IB theory building from the OLI paradigm and institutional theory -- while 
simultaneously integrating the highly fragmented literature of the non-market capabilities, the 
strategic asset seeking, and the refuge seeking perspectives -- by focusing on how the home 
country institutional and resource environments influence the internationalization behavior of 
emerging market firms.  
I hope to contribute to international business and strategy literature by (1) advancing 
existing theories to explain the internationalization behavior of AMFs and EMFs alike, while 
integrating the non-market capabilities, strategic asset seeking and refuge seeking perspectives 
with the OLI paradigm; (2) highlighting the significant differences in institutional and resource 
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environments among emerging markets through explaining how the heterogeneity of institutional 
and resource environments in home countries prompts distinct internationalization trajectories 
and internationalization strategies; and (3) providing empirical evidence at both the country and 
firm level to support my theoretical claims.  
Format of the Study 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the context of the study, the broad research question addressed 
through the thesis, the importance of this thesis, and the main contributions of this thesis. The 
following chapters are organized around the two studies examining country of origin factors: part 
1 on the determinants of OFDI scale, and part 2 on the EMF internationalization strategies. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 will review the relevant literature on internationalization, foreign 
direct investments, and emerging market multinationals. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical 
rationale of study one, and develops hypotheses which are well-grounded in theory. Chapter 4 
offers the research methodology for part 1, including the sample, measures, and the choice of 
statistical analysis methods. Chapter 5 will report on the results of part 1, presenting empirical 
evidence on the role of home country factors in determining the scale of OFDI directed towards 
advanced markets.  
Next, Chapter 6 begins the second study, and will review relevant literature on cross 
border acquisitions and emerging market multinational strategies. Chapter 7 discusses the 
theoretical rationale of part 2, and develops theoretically grounded hypotheses. Chapter 8 
presents the research methodology for part 2, which contains sample description, measures, and 
choice of statistical analysis methods. Chapter 9 reports on the results of part 2, which presents 
the empirical evidence on the role of home country institutional and resource environment in 
determining EMF behavior. 
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Chapter 10 will discuss the findings of both parts of the study. In addition, this chapter 
discusses contributions and research implications. Furthermore, this chapter elaborates on 




Chapter 2  
Literature Review for Part One 
Theories of Internationalization & Foreign Direct Investments 
In 1980, 94% of total outward FDI stock was held within 12 advanced markets and the 
top four contributors from those advanced markets accounted for 74% of the total outward FDI 
stock. In accordance with this trend, early theories of internationalization like the Product Life 
Cycle theory and the Behavioral Theory of the Uppsala School were put forth to explain the 
internationalization process and international production of advanced market firms (AMFs). In 
these early theories, internationalization refers to “an attitude of the firm towards foreign 
activities or the actual carrying out of activates abroad” (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975, 
p.306).  
First among these was Vernon’s (1966) product life cycle theory, later extended by Wells 
(1972) and Vernon (1979). It suggests products are first developed in advanced market nations to 
fulfill the demand of the consumers in domestic markets, and then exported to other advanced 
markets. The products are standardized only after fulfilling the demands of advanced markets 
resulting in lower prices. Subsequently, these standardized and low-priced products are then 
exported to emerging markets, or the production is actually shifted to the emerging markets to 
take advantage of the lower cost of production.  
Along similar lines, Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) put forth the Uppsala 
internationalization theory, which was further extended by Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 1990, 
2003). Also known as the behavioral theory of the Uppsala school, this theory suggests that 
managers choose to internationalize to countries that are similar to their firm’s home country, 
and further suggests that managers perceive similarity or dissimilarity based on the psychic 
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distance between the home and host countries of operations. Moreover, in order to avert risk, 
managers often choose to use a mode of entry that requires the lowest initial commitment of 
resources, and then managers increase resource commitments only as they learn more about the 
host country environment. Both the product life cycle and Uppsala internationalization theories 
are normative frameworks, suggesting that firms and managers prefer incremental 
internationalization, and that managers attempt to choose locations that are similar to their home 
countries. However, these theories not only fail to explain EMF internationalization, but also 
suggest that the directionality of internationalization is in reverse to what is found with EMFs.  
In contrast to these earlier theories which focused on multinational enterprise (MNE) 
internationalization, Dunning built a generalized framework that encompasses various 
explanations for how the cross-border activities of a firm are value adding. This framework 
popularly known as the OLI paradigm, or eclectic paradigm, is the mostly widely used theory in 
international business research (Dunning, 1980, 1988). The OLI paradigm is a conceptual 
framework that addresses positive rather than normative issues (Dunning & Lundan, 2008) and 
states that “the extent, form, and pattern of international production are determined by 
configuration of three sets of advantages” (Dunning, 1988, p.2). Dunning (1988) argues that 
there are three tenets that act as sources of competitive advantage: ownership advantages, 
location advantages and internationalization advantages. The first tenet, ownership (O) 
advantages, refers to firm-specific proprietary assets such as well-recognized brands and 
technologies. The second tenet, location advantages (L), refers to advantages accrued due to the 
transfer of production to locations where the cost of production is lowest (Buckley, et al., 2007). 
Finally, the third tenet, the internalization (I) advantage, refers to the benefits of bringing foreign 
production within the firm internally rather than relying on a partnership agreement; the 
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internalization of production usually reflects advantages from escaping a market failure, such as 
the costs of moral and contractual hazards, government intervention, and controls on market 
outlets (Dunning, 1981, 1988; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Ghoshal, 1987).  
The eclectic/OLI paradigm in its original form fails to explain the internationalization of 
EMFs. Its underlying assumption is that in order to internationalize, firms should possess some 
firm-specific ownership advantages to exploit (Mathews, 2006). However, EMFs often lack any 
of the described OLI advantages. In response, Matthews (2002, 2006) proposed the LLL theory 
to extend the OLI paradigm to emerging market firms, relaxing the need for a firm to have 
ownership advantages in favor of their ability to exploit linkage, leverage and learning (LLL) 
advantages.  
According to the LLL theory, firms from emerging markets pursue international 
expansion in order to obtain new capabilities. In addition, this theory argues that a new 
framework is required to understand asset exploration or asset augmentation by EMNEs. 
Furthermore, Mathews asserts that EMFs have a strategic disadvantage due to late market entry, 
often depriving them of assets that allow them to compete with traditional MNEs. Therefore, to 
compensate for their late entry, EMFs adapt accelerated internationalization with the explicit 
goal of gaining access to superior assets, resources, and/or advanced capabilities, which cannot 
be accessed in their home countries. Additionally, the LLL framework explains three strategies 
adopted by EMFs. First, EMFs establish links with traditional MNEs by offering services that 
were not beneficial for traditional MNEs to internalize. Second, with the help of the links 
established with traditional MNEs, EMFs acquire knowledge and competitive assets by 
leveraging their existing complementary resources. Finally, repeating the linking and leveraging 
process allows the EMFs to learn and helps them adapt and compete globally.  
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Similar to Mathews (2002, 2006), Luo and Tung (2007) proposed the springboard 
perspective highlighting the asset augmentation and asset seeking internationalization of EMFs. 
First, this theory suggests that EMFs face disadvantages at home due to institutional and market 
inefficiencies. Second, the internationalization of EMFs is a methodical and deliberate action to 
facilitate firm growth, while establishing a competitive position in the global marketplace. Third, 
the activities of EMFs are both repetitive and revolving. Repetitive, because M&A activities are 
reoccurring. One M&A may improve one capability, while another M&A may improve a 
completely different capability. Revolving, because EMNEs often integrate their internationally-
acquired capabilities to the operations in their home country.  
A related noteworthy stream of research arises from the proposed “refuge seeking,” or 
escape, perspectives (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Witt & Lewin, 2007). These approaches argue 
that the internationalization of firms is a response to conventional home country institutional 
constraints (Grosse & Trevino, 1996; Thomas, & Grosse, 2001), such as barriers to domestic 
investments, political and policy instability, and high taxes (Guar, Kuman, & Singh, 2014). 
Recent research has also expanded to other home country limitations motivating escape, such as 
technological deficiencies (Chen & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012), barriers to new entry (Goldstein, 
2009), or bias toward state-owned enterprises (Nguyen, Le, & Bryant, 2013).  
Finally, a unique and compelling research stream may be termed the nonmarket 
capabilities perspective (Bonardi, Holburn, & Bergh, 2006). Lecraw (1977) demonstrated how 
certain firms from Thailand developed unique capabilities of managing and reducing risk 
exposure derived from experiences in difficult institutional environments at home. In such 
instances, the home country environment acted as a sort of furnace that led companies to 
accumulate experience maneuvering institutions in other hard-to-manage environments. Cuervo-
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Cazzura and Genc (2008) extended this perspective of nonmarket capabilities by demonstrating 
that EMFs indeed have unique advantages as compared to their advanced economy counterparts 
when navigating in the least developed countries, ostensibly due to experience working with 
weak institutions in their home country.  
All of these internationalization theories are useful in understanding some aspects of 
EMF internationalization, yet still fall short in rendering a holistic picture of EMF 
internationalization. Specifically, the LLL and Springboard perspectives focus on asset or 
capability augmentation alone, and ignore the important perspective of EMFs possessing non-
traditional ownership advantages. In addition, the new theories of nonmarket capabilities and 
refuge seeking, are not applicable to other traditional FDI motives like market seeking, natural 
resource seeking and efficiency seeking motives. Nor are they applicable to non-traditional FDI 
motives like escape motives, passive investments and support investments.  
In the next section, building on existing theories, I provide theoretical arguments that will 





Theory and Hypotheses Development  
A country is governed by several formal and informal institutions (North, 1991). In 
addition, a county is also endowed with several resources or factors that are accessible to firms in 
the country (Luo & Wang, 2012; Wan, 2005). In this section, I attempt to explain how 
institutions and the resource environment in the home country of emerging market firms will 
determine the scale of foreign direct investments from emerging markets directed towards 
advanced markets.  
Institutions are the rules that regulate business behavior and shape the competitive 
environment by influencing the costs of transactions in the market (North, 1991). As such, 
institutions play a critical role in shaping firms’ business strategy and performance (Peng, Wang, 
& Jiang, 2008). They affect firms’ motivation to produce, and the costs of contracting and 
dispute resolution (Coase, 1992). While institutions influence transactional activities between 
economic actors in the market, factor markets constitute another dimension of a country’s 
environmental context that facilitates firms’ transformational activities (Wan, 2005). A country’s 
resource environment or factors fall into one of three categories: 1) endowed factors, such as a 
country’s natural resources; 2) advanced factors which consist of a country’s physical 
infrastructure, capital and financial markets; and 3) human factors, such as the availability of 
skilled and highly educated labor force, which can contribute to a country’s innovative capacity 
(Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Factor markets are country-specific because different countries 
“possess different natural endowments and create different technological and human capital 
assets through the adoption of different policies and the following of idiosyncratic development 
courses” (Kyrkilis & Pantelidis, 2003, p.827). 
13 
 
Thus, environmental contexts in emerging economies in terms of their institutions and 
resource environment are not homogenous (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013; Wan, 
2005; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Hoskisson et al. (2013) offered a typology of emerging 
economies that classifies countries based on their institutional development and infrastructure 
and factor market development. These economies are continuously undergoing changes and 
hence, are at various stages along these dimensions (Wan, 2005). Hoskisson et al.’s (2013) 
results confirm this conjecture and suggest that given the differences in environmental contexts 
of emerging economies, the OFDI strategies that firms from these countries choose may also 
vary. 
Research in the FDI literature has mainly focused on identifying host country-specific 
determinants of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) (Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003; 
Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Yeaple, 2003) thus examining the factors that make a host country 
attractive as an FDI location. The literature on determinants of OFDI from emerging economies 
has similarly emphasized the role of the host country environment (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung 
& Qian, 2009; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012) with less attention being paid to the EMF home country 
context. For instance, Buckley et al. (2007) find that Chinese OFDI is attracted to countries that 
are culturally proximate with high levels of political risk. Similarly, Kolstad and Wiig (2012) 
find that Chinese OFDI is mainly directed toward large markets, and countries endowed with 
large stocks of natural resources and underdeveloped institutions. On the other hand, Cheung and 
Qian (2009) find significant effect of host country natural resource endowment but no effect of 
institutions on Chinese OFDI. 
Prior research on determinants of OFDI with an emphasis on the home country 
environment has provided evidence of the important role of market size (Globerman & Shapiro, 
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2003), income levels (proxy by GNP), exchange rates, human capital and openness of the 
economy as determinants of OFDI (Kyrkilis & Pantelidis, 2003). However, Kyrkilis and 
Pantelidis (2003) find that their model explains the OFDI of advanced market European 
countries better than the OFDI of emerging economies (i.e., Brazil, South Korea, Singapore, and 
Argentina) for they found fewer significant effects, and the relationships differed in direction and 
strength across emerging economies. The hypothesized relationships on the role of home country 
influence are presented in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Model for Part One 
Role of Home Country Institutional Quality 
Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions” (North, 
1991, p.5). In addition, they are the “rules of the game” in a country, and their evolution shapes 
the economic development of the country as well as determines opportunities for its firms 
(North, 1991, p.5). Firms’ conform to these institutions, which results in shaping the strategy and 
performance of the firm in domestic as well as in foreign markets (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & 
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Wright, 2000; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). “Institutions directly determine 
what arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy and to 
create competitive advantage” (Ingram & Silverman, 2002, p.20).  
In the last two decades much of the world, especially in emerging markets, has 
experienced economic deregulation and institutional transformation (Pearson, 2005), which led 
to economic development in emerging markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005). This 
deregulation and economic liberalization in emerging markets has had an especially profound 
impact on emerging market firms. First, economic liberalization increased market openness and 
resulted in an increased inflow of foreign investments (Hitt, Li, & Worthington IV, 2005), which 
led to increased competition in domestic markets.  The new lack of preferential institutional 
protection and increased competition from foreign firms -- which are often well-endowed with 
firm specific ownership advantages in the form of world renowned brands, advanced technology, 
and superior marketing and managerial capabilities (Hoskisson et al., 2000) -- leave emerging 
market firms at a disadvantage and susceptible to failure. Second, in addition to deregulation and 
the promotion of inward investments, governments in emerging markets have also become 
known for promoting OFDI to maintain competitiveness and to foster growth (Fabian et al., 
2009; Rasiah, Gammeltoft, & Jiang, 2010). For example, research has demonstrated the role of 
the Chinese government in promoting OFDI through the provision of capital (Wang, Hong, 
Kafouros, & Wright, 2012) and political maneuvering (Xia, Ma, Lu, & Yiu, 2014). Third, 
institutional development and deregulation have facilitated a wealth transfer to emerging markets 
and led to economic prosperity and ensuing demand for better products (Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
Pearson, 2005; Wright et al., 2005). Growing demand for luxury brands in countries like China 
and India, for instance, is a testament to this effect.  
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Therefore, as a nation’s institutional environment increasingly becomes deregulated and 
sheds protectionism, there is an increasing pressure on domestic firms to seek strategic initiatives 
to remain competitive in domestic markets and other emerging markets. As one such strategic 
initiative, emerging market firms are increasingly adapting a foreign direct investment based 
development strategy (Narula & Dunning, 2000), where emerging market firms are attempting to 
augment assets, seek knowledge, and gain capabilities through OFDI (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000; 
Luo, 2003; Madhok, 1997) to advanced markets (AMs).  
Thus, with the increasing development of institutions in home countries, growing foreign 
competition at home, in conjunction with the growing demand for better products, emerging 
market firms experience compelling forces to choose OFDI to AMs as a strategic initiative to 
augment- assets, seek knowledge, and gain capabilities to adapt to the reforms in their home 
country institutions. In addition, the growing promotion of OFDI policies by home-country 
governments associated with pro-market reforms combine to drive EMFs with capabilities to 
seek assets in advanced markets. Therefore, it is likely that there will continue to be a growing 
trend of emerging market firms investing in advanced markets when there subsists notable 
institutional development in their home country. Therefore, it is hypothesized:  
Hypothesis 1a: There is a linear and positive relationship between the home-country quality of 
economic institutions and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a linear and positive relationship between the home-country quality of 
regulatory institutions and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets. 
Hypothesis 1c: There is a linear and positive relationship between the home-country quality of 




Role of Home Country Factor Market Development 
Factor markets are tangible resources that are available to a firm in a country’s 
environment to produce goods and services (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). These factors include 
physical infrastructure and quality human capital, that are recognized as key factors for a 
country’s innovation and industrial productivity (Furman, Potter, & Stern, 2002; Porter & Stern, 
2002). Therefore, home country factor markets play a significant role in the success of EMFs to 
profit through economic opportunities like FDI (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Recognizing the 
importance of much needed factor markets, some countries have begun investing significantly 
into infrastructure, education and training, and research and development -- with South Korea, 
Taiwan and Brazil as notable emerging markets that have taken this route (Wan, 2005).  
Though some countries have started developing their own factor markets (e.g., South 
Korea, Taiwan and Brazil) and other countries have pre-existing factor markets (e.g., Russia and 
countries part of former Soviet Union), emerging markets are endowed with varying levels in 
their factor market development and are  hence heterogeneous with respect to this variable. In 
response, firms in countries with a low level of factor market development tend to focus on 
product capabilities, while firms in countries with munificent factor markets often focus on 
innovation capabilities (Wan, 2005). Though the presence of well-developed factor markets 
provide an advantage to firms and allow them to focus on the development of innovation 
capabilities, these well-developed markets are accessible to all firms, both domestic and foreign, 
and thus, do not provide firm-specific ownership advantages. Moreover, such munificent factor 
markets attract foreign firms, who then attempt to capitalize on these location-specific 
advantages enabled by the country’s factor market.  
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Though the presence of munificent factor markets in a domestic market may not provide 
firms with firm-specific advantages, the presence of foreign firms in a domestic market allows 
the domestic firms to forge links with these foreign firms, leverage the munificent domestic 
factor markets, and learn by repeatedly applying linking and leveraging with these firms from 
advanced economies (Mathews, 2006). In addition, firms from countries with munificent factor 
markets can also venture into advanced market nations to newly leverage their home country 
advantages and learn from the firms in the advanced market nations through OFDI. In sum, the  
presence of well-developed factor markets in the home country aids in developing innovation 
capabilities with relative ease, while conversely, their absence would handicap firms in their 
ability to learn and combine new knowledge. Therefore, it is likely that the degree of factor 
market development in home countries will determine the propensity of emerging market firms 
to venture into advanced countries either to learn or to leverage, and possibly further serve firms 
or markets in these advanced countries, directly driving the scale of OFDI to advanced countries. 
Hence, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a linear and positive relationship between the home-country level of 
factor market development and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.  
Role of Home Country Capital Market Development 
Firms are not only subjects of their institutional environment and factor markets but they 
are also subjects of capital markets and their influences. Capital market development is central in 
guiding the investments of firms, because capital markets not only determine the availability and 
cost of capital, but also the efficiency of capital allocation to value-creating investments 
(Wrugler, 2000).  Specifically, the quality of capital markets determines the efficiency with 
which capital is allocated to investments creating high value and withdrawal of capital from 
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investments yielding poor value (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2011). .Moreover, the level of 
capital market development also determines the degree of minority shareholder protection (La 
Porta, De-Salanes, Shelifer, & Vishny, 1997) as well as the degree to which investments are 
directed towards creating shareholder value. 
Capital markets are important for FDI for two reasons. First, capital markets determine 
the availability of capital and the costs of capital. Second, capital markets also determine the 
efficiency of capital allocation, where firms attempt to direct the available capital towards value 
creation investments; e.g., FDI directed towards advanced nations. The presence of capital 
market imperfections is acknowledged by IB as a field, and in particular, the presence of market 
imperfections suggests market segmentation (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2008) across countries. 
Assuming market segmentation implies that risk-adjusted capital costs differ across countries. 
This variation in the cost of capital for foreign investments affects the present value of 
investments and thereby, the profitability of investments (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2011). 
Therefore, the ensuing low cost and high availability of capital as a byproduct of capital market 
development provides distinct advantages to the firms originating from these economies. 
Likewise, firms originating from countries with underdeveloped capital markets face difficulty 
with the availability and cost of capital, putting firms originating from these economies at a 
disadvantage.  Home country governments in emerging markets with poorly developed capital 
markets are known to provide low-cost capital assistance to firms investing in advanced markets 
to maintain competitiveness of the country (Scott, 2002; Warner, Hong, & Xu, 2004) For 
example, many Chinese firms’ receive significant advantages over other country firms as a result 
of low-cost capital available through government assistance for OFDI (Buckley et al., 2010).  
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Yet, the means of allocation is often very inefficient, and only a selected few firms tend to have 
preferential access to such capital (Buckley et al., 2010).  
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the varying level of capital market development 
in home countries of emerging markets will influence the volume of FDI directed towards 
advanced nations, owing to the availability and cost of capital and how efficiently the capital is 
allocated. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a linear and positive relationship between home-country capital market 
quality and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets. 
Hypothesis 3b: There is a linear and positive relationship between home-country capital market 
size and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.  
Role of Home Country Technological Readiness 
Technology is considered crucial in the industrialization and development of a nation. 
Several studies have argued that technological progress plays a pivotal role in the sustained 
economic development of a nation (Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Grossman & Helpman, 1991; Lee, 
2001; Romer, 1990). The technological divide between advanced markets and emerging markets 
is wide, however, recent trends indicate that emerging economies -- especially, China, Korea and 
India -- are catching up with advanced markets; for example: China filed the highest number of 
patent applications in 2013, surpassing both the United States and Japan, while Korea has 
surpassed the European Union (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2013). In addition, 
there is a growing presence of emerging market firms in technologically-intensive industries 
(Alvarez & Marin, 2013), which indicates that emerging markets are bridging the gap and 
attaining some technological advancement.  
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The presence of emerging market firms in technologically intense industries is an output 
of the transformation of their industrial structure and other factors influencing their technological 
and commercial specialization; a process that is influenced by a more complex system tied to the 
national innovation system and country environment (Narula & Wakelin, 1995). Specifically, the 
transformation of the innovation system and technological environment is highly dependent on 
the ability of a country and its firms to adapt available technology through an inward transfer in 
the initial stages of industrialization (Mowery & Oxley, 1995). Historically, nations that have 
indeed strengthened their ‘national absorptive capacity’ have benefited the most from inward 
technological transfers (Mowery & Oxley, 1995, p.67).  
The national absorptive capacity which is essential for technological adaptations by local 
firms is dependent on countries’ technological readiness (Lee, 2001). FDI is considered to be a 
main source of technological development for emerging markets (GCR, 2015). Accordingly, the  
FDI literature attributes the growing technological advancement of emerging economies to either 
inward FDI spillover (Sinani & Meyer, 2004) or strategic asset seeking FDI by emerging market 
firms (Buckley, Cross, Tan, Liu, & Voss, 2008).  The Springboard perspective (Luo & Tung, 
2007) in particular recognizes that emerging market firms venture into advanced nations in 
search of strategic assets like technology in order to integrate the acquired technology with 
domestic operations.  
Therefore, it could be argued that for emerging market firms to capitalize on 
technological advancement through FDI, their home country’s technological readiness plays a 
critical role. This technological readiness, based on the home country providing a sufficient level 
of technological infrastructure, plays a pivotal role for emerging market firms who require the 
infrastructure to support the integration of the technologies that were acquired from the advanced 
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markets through OFDI.   Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the degree to which a specific 
emerging market will venture into an advanced nation through OFDI will be at least partly 
dependent on its technological readiness. Hence, the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a linear and positive relationship between home-country technological 





Research Methods  
Data 
The empirical data to test hypotheses 1 through 4 was based on an OFDI database 
obtained for 60 emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2013 list) during the years 2006-2012. 
OFDI data was derived from UN bilateral FDI statistics published in 2014 by UNCTAD. The 
analysis was confined to OFDI directed towards advanced markets. However, due to missing 
data, only 48 emerging markets listed in Table 1 were used in the final analysis. Analysis was 
performed using a sample of 208 observations.  Home country environment data was obtained 
from a variety of sources such as the Global Competiveness Index, World Bank-World 
Development Indicators, Heritage foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, and the 
International Country Risk Guide. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) to advanced market nations. Data pertaining to OFDI was obtained from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development-Bilateral FDI Statistics. OFDI is measured as 
yearly outflows of FDI to advanced market nations in millions of US Dollars. This data was 
obtained for the years 2006 through 2012. To normalize the data, a log modular transformation 
of OFDI was performed.  
Independent Variables. There are four independent variables used in this study: 
institutional development, factor market development, capital market development, and 
technological readiness. Data pertaining to independent variables was obtained for the years 





List of Countries for OFDI Analysis 
 
Argentina  Malaysia  
Bangladesh Mauritius  
Botswana  Mexico  
Bosnia & Herzegovina Morocco  
Brazil  Nigeria  
Bulgaria  Pakistan  
Chile  Peru  
China Philippines  
Colombia  Poland 
Cote d’Ivoire Portugal 
Croatia Romania  
Czech Republic Saudi Arabia  
Egypt  Slovakia  
Georgia  Slovenia  
Ghana South Africa  
Greece  South Korea 
Hungary  Sri Lanka 
India  Thailand 
Indonesia  Tunisia  
Israel  Turkey  
Jamaica  Ukraine 
Jordan   
Kazakhstan  
Kenya   
Kyrgyzstan  
Macedonia  
a. Institutional Development. In order to effectively capture the quality of the 
institutional environment, data was drawn from a variety of sources, including Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, the International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk 
Index and the Global Competitiveness Report.  
The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom consists of ten components of 
institutions: business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment 
freedom, financial freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, freedom from corruption, and 
property rights. Each component is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing the 
25 
 
poorest level of institutional development and 100 – the highest level of development. Five of the 
ten components (business freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom and 
financial freedom) were considered.   
The excluded components included government spending, labor freedom, and freedom 
from corruption. The ‘government spending’ component which represents the “level of 
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP” and zero government spending is considered 
ideal and treated as a benchmark (The Heritage Foundation, 2015). The score on this component 
is likely to be artificially high for countries included in our analysis, as the low GDP 
denominator would overstate the investment amount by the government. The ‘labor freedom’ 
component, which concerns “minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoff, severance requirements, 
and measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and hours worked” (The Heritage Foundation, 
2015) was also excluded as it was weakly related or irrelevant to the construct of national 
institutions that aid firms in OFDI expansion. The component of freedom from corruption was 
better categorized under the political risk index rather than as an aiding institution, and was 
excluded. 
The International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk Index is built on 12 components, 
which includes government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal 
conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, 
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality.  Four of these components 
were identified as relevant to the construct of institutional development for firms 
internationalization decisions:  the investment profile, corruption, democratic accountability and 
bureaucratic quality.  The remaining components (socioeconomic conditions, internal conflict, 
external conflict, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order and ethnic tensions) were 
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dropped, because they reflect the political risk within a country and policy risk. The government 
stability component was also dropped because this stability can be high for both autocratic 
governments and stable democratic governments alike, and therefore does not truly reflect 
political risk accurately. Variable component scales and sources are provided in Table 2.  
Table 2 
 
 List of Variable Dimensions, Scales and Sources 
 
Variable Dimensions Scale Source 
Business Freedom 0-100 Index of Economic Freedom 
Monetary Freedom 0-100 Index of Economic Freedom 
Investment Freedom 0-100 Index of Economic Freedom 
Financial Freedom 0-100 Index of Economic Freedom 
Investment Profile 0-12 Political Risk Index 
Democratic Accountability 0-6 Political Risk Index 
Corruption 0-6 Political Risk Index 
Bureaucracy Quality 0-4 Political Risk Index 
Intellectual Property Protection 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Judicial Independence  1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Burden of Government Regulations 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Efficacy of Legal Framework to Resolve 
Disputes 
1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Efficacy of Legal Framework to 
Challenge Regulations 
1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Infrastructure 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Health and Primary Education 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Higher Education and Training  1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Lending Interest rates 1-7 World Development Indicators  
Market Capitalization 1-7 World Development Indicators 
Stock Traded 1-7 World Development Indicators 
Efficiency of Corporate Boards 1-7 World Development Indicators 
Auditing and Reporting Standards 1-7 World Development Indicators 
Strength of Investor Protection 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Minority Shareholder Protection 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Ease of Access to Loans 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Soundness of Banks 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Regulation of Security Exchange 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Effectiveness of Antimonopoly Policies 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Note. Index of Economic Freedom is published by Heritage Foundation 
Political Risk Index is published by International Country Risk Guide 
Global Competiveness Report is published by World Economic Forum 




Global Competitiveness Report’s components of intellectual property rights, judicial 
independence, burden of government regulations, efficacy of legal framework to resolve disputes 
and efficacy of legal framework to challenge regulations. All non-redundant GCR components 
reflecting institutional quality were included in constructing the measures of institutions.  
   To construct the measure of institutions, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed 
with oblique rotation on the remaining fourteen components. Trade freedom and fiscal freedom 
components were dropped after a preliminary EFA because of their heavy cross loadings. As 
reported in Table 3, the final EFA produced a three factor solution with eigenvalues greater than 
1.0 for all three factors and cumulative variance explained of 77.26%. The three factors captured 
economic, regulatory and political institutions. Variable component scales and sources are 




Factor Analysis Results for Institutions  
 
 Factor  1- 
Economic 
Institutions 






Business freedom .703 -.264 -.099 
Monetary freedom .723 -.134 -.356 
Investment freedom  .875 -.141 -.497 
Financial freedom .869 -.136 -.393 
Investment profile .757 -.482 -.475 
Democratic accountability .435 .322 -.750 
Corruption .336 -.344 -.724 
Bureaucracy quality .474 -.102 -.854 
Intellectual property protection .114 -.812 -.265 
Judicial Independence  .513 -.714 -.461 
Burden of government regulations .399 -.825 -.500 
Efficacy of legal framework to resolve 
disputes 
.202 -.949 -.094 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Factor Analysis Results for Institutions  
 
   
 Factor  1- 
Economic 
Institutions 






Efficacy of legal framework to 
challenge regulations 
.264 -.943 -.121 
Eigen Value 5.514 2.958 1.141 
% Variance Explained 42.412 22.755 8.775 
Cumulative% Variance Explained 42.412 65.167 77.258 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.806 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 1515.37; p <0.001 
Note. n = 371. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads 
 
b. Factor market development. Using the Global Competiveness Report’s data a measure 
of factor markets was constructed based on the three pillars of Infrastructure, Health & Primary 
Education, and Higher Education & Training. The measure reflects the original 2 pillar measure 
introduced by Hoskisson et al. (2013). However, the third pillar was included to improve upon 
the first two pillars used in the original measure. Each of these pillars were measured on a scale 
of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the lowest factor development, while 7 indicates the highest form of 
factor development. As reported in Table 4, EFA with oblique rotation resulted in a single factor 
solution with eigenvalue greater than 1. All components loaded on a single factor, explaining a 










Factor Analysis Results for Factor Markets 
 
 Factor 1: Factor Markets 
Infrastructure .873 
Health and primary education .834 
Higher education and training .946 
Eigen Value 2.352 
% Variance Explained 78.416 
Cumulative% Variance Explained 78.416 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.633 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 681.939; p <.000 
    Note. n = 371. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads 
 
c. Capital market development. In order to measure the level of capital market development, 
twelve components were considered. These twelve components include lending interest, market 
capitalization, stock market turnover, efficacy of corporate boards, auditing and reporting 
standards, strength of investor protection, minority share holder protection, ease of access to 
loans, soundness of banks, regulation of the security exchange, and effectiveness of anti-
monopoly policies. Since higher interest rates are associated with poorly developed capital 
markets, the lending interest rate component was reverse-coded.  
Definitions, measurement scales and sources of data are provided in Table 2. As reported 
in Table 5, the EFA with oblique rotation resulted in a two factor solution with eigenvalues 
greater than one. The two factor solution explained a cumulative variance of 64.78%. Lending 
interest rate was the only component that did not have a factor loading greater than .7, while all 
other components had loadings greater than .7 on either of the two factors. This led to two 










 Factor Analysis Results for Capital Market Development 
 
 Factor  1- 
Capital Market 
Quality 
Factor  2- 
Capital 
Market Size 
Lending Interest rates(Rev Code) .291 .084 
Market Capitalization .137 .966 
Stock traded .009 .951 
Efficacy of Corporate Boards .786 -367 
Auditing and Reporting Standards .917 -.410 
Strength of investor protection .426 -.564 
Minority shareholder protection .886 -.308 
Ease of access to loans .763 .067 
Soundness of banks .809 -.383 
Regulation of security exchange .838 -.214 
Effectiveness of Antimonopoly policies .842 -.077 
Eigen Value 5.187 1.881 
% Variance Explained 47.154 17.630 
Cumulative% Variance Explained 47.154 64.784 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.820 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 1785.284; p <.00 
Note. n = 371. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads 
 
d. Technological readiness. This measure was obtained by using the Technological 
Readiness pillar constructed by Global Competitiveness Report. This pillar measures technology 
adoption and information and communication technology usage in a country. This measure was 
measured using a scale of 1-7, where 1 indicates the lowest technological readiness, while 7 
indicates the highest form of technological readiness. 
Control Variable. Three country level variables were included as controls for the 
analysis. (a) GDP growth rate is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices. (b) 
GDP per capita is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. (c) Fuel exports 
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are standard international trade classification (SITC) Section 3 mineral fuel exports as a 
percentage of total merchandize exports of the country.  
In addition, to avoid omitted variable bias, dummies were created for time periods and 
the region of the emerging market.  Dummies were constructed for the years 2006-2011, 
excluding 2012 which served as the reference year.  Dummies for four regions were created, 
which included Africa, Asia, Europe and North America, with South America as the reference 
region.   
Statistical Analysis 
To test for hypothesis 1a to 4, a panel regression was recommended owing to the panel 
nature of data.  To determine whether a fixed effects regression was more suitable than a random 
effects regression, a Hausman test was conducted. The Hausman test resulted in an insignificant 
Chi-square (p>0.05), which led to the rejection of the null hypothesis, thus a fixed effects 
regression was inappropriate. Further, to evaluate the appropriateness of a random effects 
regression over an ordinary least square regression in hypothesis testing, the Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test was performed. This test reported an insignificant chi-square 
(p>0.05), which suggests that an OLS regression was the most suitable method of testing the 
hypothesis for the given dataset.  
To test the seven hypothesized relationships (H1a-4), an OLS regression was performed. 
The first Model 1 OLS regression includes only the control variables.  Model 2 includes the 
control variables and the institutional development variables (economic, regulatory and political 
institutions) were entered into the equation to test for hypothesis 1a, 1b, and 1c. In the next step, 
(Model 3) I added factor market development, the next model (Model 4) I added the two 
dimensions of capital markets (capital market quality and capital market size) to the existing 
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The descriptive statistics of mean and standard deviations, along with the bivariate 
correlations for all variables, are reported in Table 6. All correlations were below the standard 
cutoff limit of 0.7, except for three: GDP per capita and factor markets (r = 0.71), capital 
market quality and capital market size (r = 0.76), and capital market quality and regulatory 
institutions (r = 0.73) were all marginally above the standard cutoff limit of 0.7; a high 
correlation is expected for panel data. Due to these correlations, special care (in the form of 
multicollinearity diagnostics and separate regressions) was taken to monitor and observe the 
adverse impact of high correlations between independent variables. However, the analyses are 
not subject to multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors (VIF) were well below the 
standard cutoff (VIF<10) limits.  
Table 6 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 FDI 1992.59 228.88           
2 GDP PC 9219.83 508.69 .39
**
          
3 GDP GR       4.13       .26 −.06 .01         
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10 CMS         .01       .07 .43
**






 .76  
11 TR       3.66       .05 −.07 −.12
*










GDP PC: GDP Per-capita  RI: Regulatory Institutions CMS: Capital Market Size 
GDP GR: GDP growth rate  PI: Political Institutions  TR: Technological Readiness  
FE: Fuel Exports   FM: Factor Markets 









Table 7 presents the results of analyzing the effect of the home country environment on 
scale of OFDI. Control variables along with region and year dummies were included in the 




Results of OLS Regression  
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model3 
 β (std. errors) β (std. errors) β (std. errors) 
Constant  4.36 (.53)   4.64 (.57)    .19  (1.80) 
2006 −.04 (.52)   −.05 (.53)  −.05   (.52) 
2007 −.00 (.52)     .01 (.53)    .05   (.53) 
2008 −.00 (.51)     .00 (.52)    .04   (.53) 
2009   .02 (.51)     .03 (.52)    .06   (.52) 
2010   .01 (.52)   −.03 (.51)  −.03   (.51) 
2011   .01 (.52)     .01(.51)    .01   (.51) 
Africa −.15 (.52)   −.06 (.62)  −.01   (.63) 
Asia   .04
*
 (.43)     .04 (.47)    .05   (.46) 
Europe −.26 (.42)   −.15
†
 (.44)  −.17
*
   (.44) 
North America −.02 (.79)   −.00 (.78)  −.00   (.77) 
GDP growth rate −.01 (.00)   −.03 (.00)  −.02   (.00) 
GDP per-capita   .52
**
 (.00)     .41
**
 (.00)    .29
**
  (.00) 
Fuel Exports −.07 (.00)   −.09 (.00)  −.07   (.00) 
Econ Institutions     −.25
**
 (.27)  −.25
**
  (.27) 
Regl. Institutions      .11 (.22)  −.00  (.25) 
Politic. Institutions      .31
**
 (.24)    .29
**
 (.24) 
Factor Markets      .25 (.39) 
Cap. Mkt Quality    
Cap Mkt Size    
Tech Readiness    
R-squared .33 .36 .38 










p < 0.01. 
*
 p < 0.05. 
†




fuel exports (β = −0.09, p<0.10) were significant, leading Model 1 with controls alone 
explaining 29% of the variance (adj. R
2 
= 0.29). Model 2 explained 32% of variance (adj. R
2 
= 
0.32),   with the added three institutional development variables.    
 
Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Results of OLS Regression  
  
Variables Model 4 Model 5 
 β (std. errors) β (std. errors) 
Constant   .76  (3.19)    .46 (3.19) 
2006 −.03    (.56)    .06   (.63) 
2007   .02    (.59)    .08   (.62) 
2008   .06    (.54)    .12   (.56) 
2009   .07    (.55)    .09   (.55) 
2010 −.03    (.53)    .01   (.53) 
2011 −.02    (.51)    .01   (.51) 
Africa −.06    (.67) −.12    (.69) 
Asia −.19
†
    (.50) −.25
**
    (.51) 
Europe −.18
*
    (.49) −.17
†
    (.49) 
North America   .00    (.81)   .02    (.81) 
GDP growth rate   .03   (.05)   .04    (.05) 
GDP per-capita   .26
**
  (.00)   .18
†
    (.00) 
Fuel Exports   .01   (.00)   .02    (.00) 
Econ Institutions  −.02
**
  (.32) −.32
**
    (.35) 
Regl. Institutions   .08   (.34)   .09    (.33) 
Politic. Institutions   .22
* 
  (.28)   .16 
†
   (.29) 
Factor Markets   .37
**
  (.43)   .19    (.52) 
Cap. Mkt Quality −.06   (.49) −.06    (.49) 
Cap Mkt Size   .24
**
   (.14)   .23
**
    (.14) 
Tech Readiness    .35
*
   (.52) 
R-squared .47 .49 


















Economic institutions (β = −0.25, p<0.01) had a negative and significant effect opposite 
to hypothesis 1a, while political institutions (β = 0.31, p<0.01) had a positive and significant 
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effect, lending support to hypothesis 1c. Regulatory institutions (β = 0.11, p >0.05) had a 
positive effect but was not significant at the .05 level, therefore hypothesis 1b was not supported. 
Model 3 tested the effects of factor markets on OFDI Scale, and showed factor markets 
have a positive and significant (β = 0.25, p<0.05) effect, supporting hypothesis 2, explaining 
34% of variance (adj. R
2 
= 0.34). The effect of capital market development (capital market 
quality and capital market size) was tested in Model 4, and these variables explained 42% of the 
variance (adj. R
2 
= 0.42).    Capital market quality (β = −0.06, p>0.05) while negative was not 
significant; capital market size (β = 0.24, p<0.01), on the other hand, had a positive and 
significant effect.  The last model, Model 5, explained 43.5%, (adj. R 
2
=  0.45) and showed that 
technological readiness had a positive and significant effect β = 0.35, p<0.05) on the scale of 
OFDI from the emerging market to advanced markets.  





Literature Review for Part Two 
EMFs often choose inorganic modes of foreign expansion including cross border 
acquisitions (Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, & Chitoor, 2010). In recent years, the acquisition behavior of 
EMFs has attracted remarkable attention from the business press and academic research alike. 
This attention is a product of “political inferences, media frenzy and nationalistic talks” both in 
acquirer and target nations (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2011, p.128). The interest may also be a 
product of the aggressive bidding, location choice, relatively large acquisitions, and amount of 
risk built into the deals undertaken by EMFs (Mathews, 2002, 2006; Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo & 
Tung, 2007). 
Equity-based entry modes via cross border M&As can entail partial acquisitions, where 
the equity varies between 1 and 99% or full acquisitions, where 100% of equity is owned by an 
acquirer, as in the case of wholly owned subsidiaries and full acquisitions, (Chari & Chang, 
2009). Partial acquisitions have often been considered to be a form of joint ventures or equity 
based alliance (Chen & Hennart, 2004; Das & Teng, 2000; Hennart, 1991; Inkpen, 2001) and 
research attention has considered equity modes in joint ventures (Cuypers & Martin, 2009; Luo, 
2001).  
Chari and Chang (2009) suggests that understanding the determinants of equity 
participation in cross-border acquisitions contribute significantly to our understanding of 
decision making in internationalization.  Specifically, equity participation has a significant 
impact on risk, resource commitment, and return on investment for cross border acquisitions. 
Earlier research into acquisitions indicated that the degree of risk and resource commitment 
increases with increase in the share of equity in a venture (Erramilli & Rao, 1990). Other studies 
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on equity ventures corroborated these claims of equity participation as an important indicator of 
the amount of control assumed by the acquirer, the degree of resource commitment required, and 
the degree of risk involved (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2003; 
Luo, 2001).  
Firms tend to reduce risk in unfamiliar foreign markets by lowering their amount of 
equity participation and reducing the amount of resource commitment required (Folta, 1998). 
Such actions reduce the costs of exiting the venture (Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990). Therefore, 
firms choose to avert risk by choosing a lower level of equity when venturing into countries with 
lower levels of institutional development (Jakobsen & Meyer, 2008). Conversely and in 
accordance to Jakobsen and Meyer’s (2008) findings, Chun (2009) demonstrated that firms often 
commit a higher level of equity when host countries provide higher levels of protection to 
property rights in order to gain greater control of the acquisition. Furthermore, Luo (2001) found 
that the amount of equity risk exposure is highly dependent on the host country environmental 
dynamism, heterogeneity and hostility.  
Other literature suggests that institutions and the institutional difference between home 
and host country of acquisition matters significantly.  In particular, the differences in formal 
institutions and informal institutions between home and host countries often impact the choice of 
entry mode or ownership structure during internationalization process (Demirbag, Galister, & 
Tatoglu, 2007; Estrin, Baghdasaryan, & Meyer, 2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). 
Additionally, firms tend to lower their amount of equity commitment to cross-border acquisitions 
due to increases in the liability of foreignness and endogenous uncertainty in the host countries 
(De-Buele, Elia, & Piscitello, 2014). Consequently, increases in formal and informal institutional 
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distances often encourage firms to pursue partial acquisitions as opposed to full acquisitions 
(Contractor, Lahiri, Elango, & Kundu, 2014).  
Extant research also suggests that the level of equity obtained and the degree of control in 
a venture determines the ability of  the acquirer to transfer tacit knowledge from the acquisition 
(Chari & Chang, 2009; Das & Teng, 2000; Pisano, 1989) or protect knowledge it contributed to 
the venture (Luo, 2001).  The importance of protecting knowledge is also reflected by Chen and 
Hennart (2004) who demonstrated that Japanese firms attempt to seek higher stakes when 
acquiring US firms, to prevent ex-post opportunism of target firm managers through holding up 
the tacit knowledge of the firm.  
Information asymmetry and significant inefficiencies often set the stage for difficulties 
with the valuation of targets and their resources in cross-border M&As (Moeller & 
Schlingemann, 2007). Specifically owing to this information asymmetry and difficulties in 
valuing targets, acquirers often find it difficult to complete the acquisition. When suitable 
contractual and institutional remedies are unavailable, the potential benefits of acquisitions are 
even more severely undermined by these irredeemable potential risks (Reuer, Shenkar, & 
Ragozinno, 2004).  
In cross border acquisitions where information asymmetry is a potential problem, the 
bidding firm’s method of payment becomes indicative of its assessment of the target firm and its 
resources (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Generally, when shares are used as a method of payment, it 
signals that the bidder’s existing assets are overvalued; in contrast, when cash is used as the 
medium of exchange, the acquirer assets are generally considered to be undervalued (Travlos, 
1987). As a result, the market participants receive cash offers as the good news, while the 
exchange of stock is viewed as bad news concerning the value of the bidding firm’s assets.  
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Furthermore, research asserts that contingent payouts or stock payments as opposed to 
cash purchased deals indicates that risk is shared with the target firm (Hansen, 1987; Martin, 
1996).  Hansen’s (1987) study suggested that acquirers tend to prefer contingent pay outs when 
the target is overvalued as it is used as a method of risk mitigation (Chang, 1988). Stock 
payments signal that the bidding firm management perceives potential risk and information 
asymmetry -- possibly in combination with skepticism about potential synergies -- which results 
in investors considering the acquisition risky (Schijven & Hitt, 2012) , and further resulting in 
significant losses for bidding firms (Travlos, 1987). In addition, Fishman (1989) demonstrated 
that target managements were more likely to reject acquisition attempts when bidders offered 
stock bids, indicating in this case that target management is unwilling to share the risk. Agreeing 
with the above Reuer et al. (2004) also argue that contingent payouts are often used as a method 
of financing an acquisition to mitigate risk arising from information asymmetry and difficulties 
in valuation of target firms. Additionally, they assert that contingent payouts are often a medium 
of financing an acquisition in high-tech and service firms, owning to the difficulty in valuation of 
target resources. Furthermore, they found that bidding firms’ acquisition experience reduces the 
use of contingent payouts because of an increase in partnering capabilities, in conjunction with 
hazard mitigation capabilities and information processing capabilities.  
While cross border acquisitions are considered investments that are embedded with 
significant risks that strongly motivate acquiring firms to pay as little as possible (Beckman & 
Haunschild, 2002; Haunschild, 1994), research indicates that such acquiring firms on average 
tend to pay 20-30% acquisition premiums (Laamanen, 2007). Accordingly, investors tend to 
display negative reactions to these high premiums (Schijven & Hitt, 2012), likely due to strong 
evidence that acquisition premiums negate the positive synergistic effects arising from 
41 
 
acquisitions (Sirower, 1997).  Interestingly, a limited number of studies do argue and find 
evidence that the acquisition premium may in fact be positively related to synergistic gains 
(Sirower, 1997; Slusky & Caves, 1991). 
  Managers must determine the premium they will pay, then, based on their valuation 
placed on target assets, which reflects their assumptions about ensuing synergies.  Home country 
characteristics are likely associated with this managerial risk taking assessment.  For instance, 
Rossi & Volpin (2004) demonstrated that regulations in an acquiring firm’s home country, in 
particular regarding accounting standards and shareholder protections, can affect managers’ 
willingness to engage in high risk choices, such as how they structure deals and whether to pay 
high premiums for acquisitions. Conversely, Coffee (1999, 2002) provided evidence that target 
shareholders in advanced markets will demand some level of premium for having their 
investments moved under shareholder regimes in home countries with relatively poorer corporate 
governance standards.  In sum, EMFs end up paying higher premiums than firms from advanced 
market home countries for their targets in advanced markets.   
  Despite these dynamics, emerging market firms have established their relevance to the 
global acquisition markets by not only being attractive destinations for FDI, but more recently, as 
substantial producers of global FDI.  Importantly, the research has not offered much granularity 
for differences in EMFs based on their home country.  Rather, the literature has concentrated at 
the more macro level status based on the advanced versus emerging dichotomy.  Still, the 
insights from theory based on this vantage point provide important suppositions for further 
theory development at the individual country level. 
   The first relevant research stream I refer to here as the nonmarket capabilities 
perspective (Bonardi, Holburn, & Bergh, 2006). Lecraw (1977) early demonstrated how certain 
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firms from Thailand developed unique capabilities of managing and reducing risk exposure that 
was derived from their experience in a difficult institutional environment at home. Here the 
home country environment acted as a sort of furnace that led companies to gain experience 
maneuvering institutions in other hard-to-manage environments. Cuervo-Cazzura and Genc 
(2008) extended this perspective of nonmarket capabilities by demonstrating that EMFs indeed 
have unique advantages as compared to their advanced economy counterparts due to capabilities 
developed from experience working with weak institutions at home.  
  A second research stream informative to the impact of home country characteristics on 
EMF investment can be derived from the strategic asset seeking perspective (Dunning, 1998).   
Here, firms engage in FDI to acquire the assets of foreign firms that will promote their long term 
strategic growth and sustain their global competitiveness (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p.72). 
Mathews (2002, 2006) further linked this tendency with country characteristics through his link, 
learn and leverage perspective which noted that EMFs generally have a strategic disadvantage 
owing to their late entry in the global marketplace, depriving them of competitive assets which 
would allow them to compete with traditional MNEs. To compensate for this late entry EMFs 
adapt accelerated internationalization to gain access to superior assets, resources, or advanced 
capabilities, which cannot be accessed in their home countries. To gain access to these strategic 
assets EMFs establish links with traditional MNEs by offering services that were not beneficial 
for firms in advanced markets to internalize. Next, with the help of the links established with 
advanced multinationals, EMFs acquire knowledge and competitive assets by leveraging their 
existing complementary resources. Finally, repeating the linking and leveraging process allows 
the EMFs to learn, helping them adapt and compete globally.  
  A similar perspective that builds on the strategic asset seeking motive is referred to as the 
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springboard perspective (Luo & Tung, 2007) which explores both the asset augmentation and 
asset seeking internationalization of EMFs.  Critically, this theory draws on the fact that 
emerging market firms often face disadvantages at home due to institutional and market 
inefficiencies. Consequently, internationalization of EMFs represent a methodical and deliberate 
action to facilitate firm growth, while establishing a competitive position in global market place. 
Third, these movements toward FDI become repetitive and revolving. The repetitive aspect 
captures that EMFs will repeat acquisition activities continually, however, one acquisition may 
improve one capability while another acquisition may improve a completely different capability. 
The revolving character captures the tendency for EMFs to integrate their acquired capabilities 
with home country operations after each of their acquisitions.   
  A third perspective explaining EMF investment behaviors posits an escape imperative 
from what Shleifer and Vishny (1998) memorably depicted as “the grabbing hand” of 
government. While sparsely addressed in the IB and strategy literature until the recent synthesis 
by Witt and Lewin (2007), current studies have been ramping up explorations of the escape 
response motivated by conventional home country institutional constraints (Grosse & Trevino, 
1996; Thomas & Grosse, 2001), such as barriers to domestic investments, political and policy 
instability, and high taxes (Guar, Kuman, & Singh, 2014). Recent research has also expanded to 
other deprivations motivating escape such as technological deficiencies (Chen & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2012), barriers to new entry (Goldstein, 2009), or bias toward state-owned enterprises 
(Nguyen, Le, & Bryant, 2013).  
 Though all three streams of research attempt to address EMFs cross-border investment 
behavior, a certain degree of friction exists between these strands of research and each tends to 
emphasize an emerging versus advanced dichotomy, consequently leading to treating emerging 
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home countries rather homogenously. A theoretical synthesis of these existing perspectives in 
relation to a particular acquisition process, here the premiums resulting from aggressive bidding 
practices, can extend our understanding of EMF strategies and behavior.  
  Moreover, empirical follow up has similarly been limited to treating emerging market 
home countries as homogenous entities. And exceptions, such as Thomas and Grosse, (2001), 
have not looked at the unique condition of when EMFs enter an advanced country. Hoskisson et 
al. (2013) convincingly demonstrated that these emerging markets vary significantly in their 
institutional and resource environment. Further, the different levels of quality in the home 
country’s institutional and resource environment will promote certain distinct investment 
behaviors (Wan, 2005). 
  In the following section I extend insights from above to develop hypotheses linking home 






Theory and Hypotheses Development  
Role of Home Country Environment 
Advanced markets are assumed to differ greatly from emerging economies in terms of 
economic and institutional development (Ramamurti, 2004) and as such, they may constitute a 
challenging environment for emerging market firms (Zaheer, 1995). Nevertheless, researchers 
note that some EMFs tend to enter advanced markets before expanding into more similar host 
countries (Ramamurti, 2012). In addition to these non-traditional choices of location and deal 
structures, EMFs tend to value advanced market targets differently than advanced multinational 
peers in the acquisition process, evidenced by aggressive bidding that results in unusually high 
premiums (Hope et al., 2011). 
Studying the risk-taking propensities of managers as they interact with particular decision 
situations helps us understand firm behavior (Baird & Thomas 1985; Boubakri, Mansi, & Saffar, 
2013). A wide array of country characteristics are used to form managerial assessments; For 
instance, managers develop knowledge and experience with political, regulatory, and trade 
institutions; familiarity with factor quality in country resource environments; and understanding 
of capital risk and currency trends. Such characteristics within a firm’s home country shape the 
risk-taking proclivities of managers, and their incentives and understanding of the growth 
opportunities available to their firms (Boubakri et al., 2013).  Below I look at how the levels of 
quality of each of these country characteristics are likely to uniquely motivate M&As by 
domestic firms, and in return, impact the acquisition behaviors. The hypothesized relationships 






Figure 2. Theoretical Model for Part Two 
 
Role of Home Country Institutional Quality 
Institutions serve as the rules that regulate business behavior and shape the competitive 
environment, thus influencing the costs of transactions in the market (North, 1991). More 
significantly, they affect firms’ motivation to produce via the costs of contracting and dispute 
resolution (Coase, 1992). As such, country institutions play a critical role in shaping a firm’s 
business strategy and performance (Peng et al., 2008). 
Poor quality institutions tend to increase the hardships for firms through recurrent 
government interferences, the absence of protection for intellectual property, and inefficient 
contract enforceability (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Kalotay & Sulstarova, 2010). Specifically, 
EMFs operating in countries with poorly developed institutions are subject to government policy 
changes that directly or indirectly expropriate their assets or profits (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; 
Korbin, 1979). Hence, firms operating in these environments must adapt by developing 
nonmarket capabilities – i.e., corporate political activity to manage institutional actors (Hillman, 
Keim, & Schuler, 2004; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016). 
  Prominent examples of such nonmarket capabilities include embedding themselves with 
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political contributions, forming joint ventures with state owned enterprises, or placing politically 
well-connected individuals on boards (Boubakri, Mansi, & Saffar, 2013).  As a result, these 
EMFs tend to avoid “political and contractual hazards” (Sun, Mellahi, &Thun, 2010, p.1161), 
“discrimination, resource exclusion or expropriation or even sabotage” (Siegel, 2007, p.625), and 
are just generally less sensitive to risk from host country institutions (Holburn & Zelner, 2010). 
While embeddedness in political networks benefits firms in the short run and enhances their 
performance, in the long run these firms perform poorly and are prone to operational inefficiency 
due to the depreciation of ties and “unexpected political shocks” (Sun et al., 2010, p.1162).    
EMFs operating in such predatory institutional environments are likely to attempt to 
escape to operate in more efficient markets (Witt & Lewin, 2007).  EMF managers will value 
advanced market assets as incorporating lower risk and greater operational efficiency in the long 
run than their own assets. In such cases, though managers will still value foreign assets at their 
existing market value, their lack of experience will confine them to explore a smaller stake of 
equity as passive investments. The lack of managerial experience to operate in high quality 
institutional environment as in the case of advanced markets, combined with the lack of pressure 
to develop market capabilities at home, will push EMF managers to seek a smaller stake of 
equity in their AMF acquisitions.  
  However, in recent years, many emerging markets have focused on developing their 
overall institutional quality (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2012) by adapting pro-
market reforms.  Consequently, EMFs in these markets find their nonmarket capabilities of 
decreased value (Sun et al., 2010), and are prompted to adapt and develop market capabilities 
(Wan, 2005).  Furthermore, an increase in institutional quality in a firm’s home country tends to 
increase competition in domestic markets through both domestic and foreign new entry (Luo & 
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Wang, 2012).   
   Thus, EMFs are increasingly forced to adapt and learn market capabilities in home 
countries with higher levels of institutional quality. However, because they often possess 
minimal such capabilities, EMFs find they are at a competitive disadvantage to their advanced 
multinational counterparts.  Acquiring direct access to advanced market target firm capabilities 
provides an important channel for EMFs to learn how overcome their disadvantages at home 
while gaining access to new markets.  Managers in these EMFs foresee considerable synergistic 
value in enhanced transaction efficiency, new market access, and capabilities that can be 
combined with home country advantages. Since, acquirers need a majority stake to transfer the 
capabilities to their home country and combine newly acquired capabilities with home country 
advantages, EMFs from emerging markets with highly developed institutional environments tend 
to seek a higher stake of equity (to assume control of target assets and capabilities), and also 
favor a full acquisition as opposed to partial acquisitions; EMFs originating from poor quality 
institutional environment seek a smaller stake of equity in advanced market acquisitions  Hence: 
Hypothesis 5a: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home 
country’s political institutions and the amount of equity sought by an EMF in and AMF 
acquisition.   
Hypothesis 5b: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home 
country’s regulatory institutions and amount of equity sought by an EMF in and AMF 
acquisition.   
Hypothesis 5c: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of home country’s 
trade institutions and the amount of equity sought by an EMF in and AMF acquisition.   
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It could be argued that the quality of the home country institutions of EMFs will also 
affect the valuation of foreign assets in advanced markets. While EMFs originating from 
countries with poorly developed institutional environment value foreign assets based on the 
efficiency of transaction, and future cash flows from investment; EMFs originating from better 
institutional environments not only value foreign assets based on the efficiency of transactions in 
advanced market operations, but also by the added value gained by acquiring market capabilities 
and the synergistic benefits gained when the acquired capabilities are combined with home 
country advantages.  
EMFs operating in countries with poorly developed institutional environments are 
subjected to the risk of their governments opportunistically altering their policies to directly or 
indirectly expropriate the firm’s assets or profits (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Korbin, 1978). 
Therefore, it may be argued that acquisitions of AMFs only serve as a safe harbor to investments 
of EMFs originating from poor quality institutional environments.  But for those EMFs 
originating from a better quality institutional environment, the potential to learn and incorporate 
sophisticated market capabilities provides unique additional value.  Thus, advanced market 
acquisition targets are of greater value than for their advanced market firm counterparts which 
already hold sophisticated market capabilities, and of greater value than for their EMF 
counterparts who do not aspire gain these capabilities into their domestic operations.  Therefore, 
EMFs from countries with superior formal institutions are likely to gain additional value from 
AMF market and non-market capabilities, and thus the hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6a: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home 
country’s political institutions and the acquisition premium offered by an EMF in an AMF 
acquisition.   
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Hypothesis 6b: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home 
country’s regulatory institutions and the acquisition premium offered by an EMF in an AMF 
acquisition.   
Hypothesis 6c: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home 
country’s trade institutions and the acquisition premium offered by an EMF in an AMF 
acquisition.   
The influence of the home country institutional quality will also have an effect on another 
aspect of acquisitions, i.e., the method of payment.  Acquisitions are bound by information 
asymmetry, and a contingent method of payments, where the acquirer uses its own stock as part 
of the offer, are regularly used to reduce the risk owing to information asymmetry (Reuer et al., 
(2004). However, a contingent method of payments will also reduce the ability of the acquirer to 
draw favorable contractual terms with the target firm. Moreover, the likelihood of target 
managers accepting a contingent method of payment decreases when the acquirer stock is 
associated with higher risk (Reuer et al., (2004).  
EMFs originating from countries with poor quality institutional environments tend to face 
greater risk; this high amount of risk is embedded in the acquirer stock, and generally motivates 
acquirers to rely on all cash methods of payment as opposed contingent methods of payment. 
Conversely, EMFs originating from higher quality institutional environments are more sensitive 
to risk, and therefore, often opt for contingent methods of payment. Furthermore, the value of the 
advanced market targets lies in the ability of EMF to transfer the capabilities and integrate the 
resources with home operations and therefore, the contingent methods of payments can also be 
used to tie the integration to the performance. Therefore, the likelihood of EMFs using a 
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contingent payment mode increases with an increase in the quality of home country institutional 
environments. Hence, the hypotheses 
Hypothesis 7a: There is a positive relationship between the quality of the home country’s 
political institutions and the probability of using a contingent method of payment by an EMF in 
an AMF acquisition.  
Hypothesis 7b:  There is a positive relationship between the quality of the home country’s 
regulatory institutions and the probability of using a contingent method of payment by an EMF 
in an AMF acquisition.  
 Hypothesis 7c: The positive relationship between the quality of the home country’s trade 
institutions and the probability of using a contingent method of payment by an EMF in an AMF 
acquisition.   
Role of Home Country Factor Market Development 
Firms are not only highly subject to the demands of the institutional environment that 
they operate in, but they also incorporate the opportunities available in their country’s factor 
market resources. These factor markets are the tangible resources in a country that are available 
to produce goods and services (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003).  Factor markets include therefore both 
physical infrastructure and quality human capital as key to supporting a country’s innovation and 
industrial productivity (Furman, Potter, & Stern, 2002; Porter & Stern, 2002).   
  Home country factor markets play a significant role in the success of emerging market 
firms to profit through economic opportunities (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Emerging market 
countries vary widely in their levels of factor market quality, which in turn strongly determines 
firm options in serving specific aspects of the industrial value chain. More particularly, firms in 
countries with low factor market quality tend to focus on production capabilities, while firms in 
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countries with munificent factor markets are better able to focus on innovation capabilities (Wan, 
2005).  
  Factor market quality is likely to contribute to the ability for advanced market assets to 
serve as strategic assets for an EMF firm.  EMFs originating from countries with poorly 
developed factor markets are likely to find limited synergistic value for advanced market assets.  
On the other hand, EMFs whose home countries support more munificent factor markets will 
assess greater opportunities to develop synergies and increase their profitability.  Sophisticated 
organizational mechanisms that are correlated with higher human capital quality are essential for 
transferring acquired target competencies, knowledge and/or technology to the home firm 
(Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005) such that firms with better factor markets are likely 
to have a higher ability for absorptive capacity.   By combining advanced market competencies 
with the advantages of a more munificent factor market at home, EMFs may also be able to 
become more competitive in their home countries, and possibly better serve other advanced 
markets through acquired advanced target assets.  
  In sum, firms in countries with higher quality factor markets will be more able to exploit 
the advantages associated with the strategic asset seeking perspective than their less factor-
endowed peers. Specifically, EMFs in poorer factor markets, while possibly able to increase the 
network of advanced market firms they serve by acquiring a network member, will most likely 
not be able to transfer the higher value chain activities of their target acquisition back to their 
home country.   
Firms from emerging markets with less munificent factor markets at home will attempt to 
acquire firms in advanced markets to access AMF networks in order to gain further access to 
markets, as opposed to attempting to transfer and integrate target firm capabilities with home 
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country operations. Therefore, such EMFs will attempt to seek a smaller share of equity. On the 
other hand, firms originating from emerging markets with well-endowed factor markets will 
attempt to assume a controlling stake or full equity to facilitate the transfer and integration of 
AMF capabilities with home country operations. Hence the hypothesis 
Hypothesis 8: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home 
country’s factor markets and the amount of equity sought by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.   
Conversely increases in factor market quality at home should mean that EMFs have a 
greater propensity to generate unique synergies, which means that the target assets are more 
valuable to firms originating from emerging markets with greater factor market munificence and 
will consequently offer higher bid premiums for acquiring advanced market firms, leading to the 
following: 
Hypothesis 9: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home 
country’s factor markets and the acquisition premium by an EMF in and AMF acquisition.   
In acquiring an AMF, the EMF originating from a country with munificent factor markets 
not only has a greater potential to generate synergies in combination with AMF, but it is also 
exposed to a higher inherent risk of failure due to the complex nature of operations and 
complexity in combining the assets. Since there is a potential risk of not realizing expected 
synergies, such EMFs are likely to engage in using contingent methods of payment instead of 
simple all cash bids. In addition, there is a greater likelihood of target management accepting 
these contingent methods of payment, due to the greater potential for synergies and abilities to 
generate future cash flows. Hence the hypothesis 
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Hypothesis 10: There is positive relationship between the quality of the home country’s factor 
markets and the probability of using a contingent method of payment by an EMF in an AMF 
acquisition.   
Role of Home Country Capital Market Development 
  In addition to resources from factor markets, financial resources play a critical role in the 
investment choices firms face. Capital market development represents the constraints, 
availability, and costs of capital to a firm in a given market (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2011), and 
incorporating this variable strongly enriches our understanding of the internationalization of 
firms (Oxelheim, Randøy, & Stonehill, 2001). Capital market development influences the 
efficiency of capital allocation in regard to directing capital towards investments with greater 
potential (La Porta et al., 1997; Wrugler, 2000).  In addition, shareholder protections and anti-
directorial rights are a hallmark of well-developed capital markets (La porta et al., 1998; Rossi & 
Volpin, 2004).  
  Differences in the quality of capital markets can explain an EMF’s approach to 
acquisitions and the premiums they will risk to access acquisitions in more stable advanced 
markets. Capital flight is one of many motives for FDI to high quality capital markets (Coffee, 
1999; 2002), based on the idea that firms seek to escape home country capital markets that are 
deficient in the availability and cost of capital, while often encumbering government 
involvement and minimal guarantees of shareholder rights.   EMFs may therefore aim to access 
advanced country capital markets for their low cost of capital (Coffee, 1999; 2002), and commit 
themselves to more stringent corporate governance standards through advanced market 
acquisitions (Hope et al., 2011). 
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EMFs attempting to associate with a more developed capital market through an advanced 
market acquisition, either to access low cost capital or to subject themselves to more stringent 
corporate governance standards, will attempt to acquire a smaller stake of equity in order to 
avoid the risk of failure and at the same time to gain access to more developed capital markets. 
EMFs from well-developed capital markets attempt to acquire target firms to gain access to 
target resources and capabilities, and to integrate them with home operations, will seek a higher 
stake of equity in the target firm. Hence the hypotheses 
Hypothesis 11a: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s capital market 
quality and equity sought by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.  
Hypothesis 11b: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s capital market size 
and equity sought by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.  
Hypothesis 11c: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s cost of capital and 
equity sought by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.  
Furthermore, some EMFs in especially poor functioning capital markets will also be 
better able to afford their acquisitions and accompanying acquisition premiums than EMFs in 
countries with better quality capital markets.  While the market rates in poorly developed 
financial markets can be higher, imperfections in these markets often allow some firms to obtain 
capital at below-market rates, as in the case of state-owned enterprises in China (Lardy, 1998; 
Warner et al., 2004) and other nations. Similarly, an associated faulty banking system may 
facilitate soft loans to EMFs for their FDI based on inefficiencies in the banking system or as a 
result of government policy (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Antkiewicz & Whalley, 2006).  EMFs are 
then able to finance their advanced market acquisition with capital at below market rates, thereby 
compensating for the higher premiums paid.  
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Finally, the absence of private shareholders, minority shareholder protection, and the 
absence of anti-directorial rights in EMF firms from poor quality market may result in over-
bidding (Rossi & Volpin, 2004) as these mechanisms serve as important checks on managerial 
hubris.  Moreover, as the home country’s capital market quality increases, the value of accessing 
capital at lower cost or of greater stability in advanced market diminishes. Unlike access to 
market capabilities and strategic assets, which increase in value as the gap between advanced and 
emerging markets lessens, lower capital market quality gaps translate to lower advantages for 
EMF firms.      
Given all of the above, I hypothesize. 
Hypothesis 12a: There is a negative relationship between the home country’s capital market 
quality and the acquisition premium by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.  
Hypothesis 12b: There is a negative relationship between the home country’s capital market 
size and the acquisition premium by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.  
Hypothesis 12c: There is a negative relationship between the home country’s cost of capital and 
the acquisition premium by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.  
Since the method of payments can be used as an instrument for mitigating risk in 
acquisitions, firms engaging in acquisitions with complex goals and more risky operations often 
adopt a contingent method of payment (Reuer et al., 2007). When the goal of an EMF is to 
acquire and transfer target firm resources and capabilities, they are undertaking complex 
operations with a high risk of failure, hence there is a greater likelihood of employing such risk 
mitigation strategies. In addition, the ability of shareholders to restrain risk taking behaviors in 
well-developed capital markets will push managers to adapt more risk mitigating strategies. In 
order to mitigate risk, firms from emerging markets with high levels of capital market 
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development are more likely to use contingent payment methods. On the contrary, firms from 
emerging markets with poorly developed capital markets with goal of accessing well-developed 
capital markets are more tolerant to risk and are less restrained by shareholder activism, hence 
such EMFs are more likely to use cash as method of payment. Therefore, I hypothesize  
Hypothesis 13a: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s capital market 
quality and the probability of the EMF using a contingent method of payment in an AMF 
acquisition.  
Hypothesis 13b: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s capital market size 
and the probability of the EMF using a contingent method of payment in an AMF acquisition.  
Hypothesis 13c: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s cost of capital and 







The empirical analysis to test hypotheses 5a-13c is based on cross border mergers & 
acquisitions (M&A) data obtained for 60 emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2013 list) 
during the years 2006-2015. However, due to the missing data only 48 emerging markets listed 




List of Acquirer Countries 
 
Argentina (18) Mexico (89) 
Azerbaijan (5) Morocco (3) 
Botswana (3) Nigeria ( 7) 
Brazil (90) Pakistan (2) 
Bulgaria (5) Peru (16) 
Chile (28) Philippines (57) 
China (1365) Poland (81) 
Colombia (18) Portugal (60) 
Croatia (1) Romania (5) 
Czech Republic (14) Russia (167) 
Egypt (25) Saudi Arabia (28) 
Estonia (2) Slovakia (6) 
Georgia (1) Slovenia (2) 
Greece (48) South Africa (164) 
Hungary (8) South Korea (405) 
India (457) Taiwan (170) 
Indonesia (60) Thailand (75) 
Israel (257) Trinidad & Tobago (1) 
Jamaica (5) Tunisia (1) 
Jordan (3) Turkey (36) 
Kazakhstan( 7) Ukraine (14) 
Kenya (1) Venezuela (2) 
Latvia (1)  
Lithuania (4)  
Malaysia (305)  
Mauritius (39)  
Note. n = 4161. Number of acquisitions from each country in parenthesis  
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The M&A transaction data was obtained from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum 
database.  Specifically, the analysis was restricted to M&A transactions with target firms located 
in advanced markets. Thomson Financial SDC Platinum data is the source of M&A data for 
many M&A research studies in international business and strategy research. The home country 
environment data was obtained from a variety of sources such as the Global Competiveness 
Index, World Bank- World Development Indicators, Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedom and International Country Risk Guide. 
Measures 
Dependent Variables. Three dependent variables were used in the analysis. The 
definition and data sources for each are as follows: 
Acquisition Premium is the overpayment over and above the value of the target firm, 
measured as a percentage of difference in price paid by the acquirer and the target’s pre-
acquisition stock price (one week before announcement)  (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, 
Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Thompson Financial SDC Platinum is the source of data.  
Equity Sought is a percentage of shares in the acquisition that the acquirer chooses to 
acquire through the specific transaction under observation (Chari & Chang, 209). The value 
ranges between 0 and 100%. The data pertaining to equity sought was also obtained from 
Thompson Financial SDC platinum.  
Mode of Payment is a dichotomous variable for the method of payment used for the 
acquisition. The acquirer either chooses to use a cash bid, or an equity bid (including a mix of 
both). If the acquirer uses any stock as a method of payment, then I considered it as contingent 
method of payment and assigned a value of 1. Alternatively if only cash was used as mode of 
payment, then it was assigned a value of 0.  
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Independent Variables. There are three independent variable used in this study. The 
data pertaining to independent variables was obtained for the years 2006 through 2015.  
a. Institutions.  In order to effectively capture the quality of the institutional 
environment, data was drawn from a variety of sources. The sources include the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk 
Index, and the Global Competitiveness Report. 
The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom captures data for ten 
institutional components: business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, 
investment freedom, financial freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, freedom from 
corruption, and property rights. Each component is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 
representing the poorest level of institutional development and 100 – the highest level of 
development. Six of the ten components (business freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, 
investment freedom, financial freedom, and property rights) were considered. A few components 
of this index were excluded including labor freedom, government spending and freedom from 
corruption. The ‘government spending’ component represents the level of government 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP and zero government spending is considered ideal and 
treated as a benchmark (The Heritage Foundation, 2015). The score on this component is likely 
to be artificially high for countries included in our analysis, since their governments are likely to 
have low GDPs which quickly makes even low spending a high percentage. Therefore, the 
government spending component was excluded. The ‘labor freedom’ component, which 
concerns minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoff, severance requirements, and measurable 
regulatory restraints on hiring and hours worked (The Heritage Foundation, 2015) was excluded 
because, this component represents less relevant to our analysis aspect of institutions. Since, the 
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component of ‘freedom from corruption’ was also considered in the political risk index, I 
excluded this component.  
International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk Index is built on twelve components, 
including: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, 
external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality. The seven components of 
socioeconomic conditions, internal conflict, external conflict, military in politics, religion in 
politics, law and order and ethnic tensions were dropped, because they reflect the political and 
policy risk within a country. The government stability component was also dropped because this 
component only reflects the stability and can be high for both autocratic governments and stable 
democratic governments alike, and therefore does not truly reflect policy risk accurately.  
The Global Competitiveness Report’s includes the components of intellectual property 
rights, judicial independence, burden of government regulations, efficacy of legal framework to 
resolve disputes and efficacy of legal framework to challenge regulations. All non-redundant 
GCR components reflecting institutional quality were included in constructing the measures of 
institutions. Definitions, scales and sources are provided in Table 9.   
To construct the measure of institutions, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was 
performed with oblique rotation on the remaining fourteen components. Fiscal freedom 
components were dropped after preliminary EFA because of heavy cross loadings. As reported in 
Table 10, the final EFA produced a three factor solution with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Three 
factor solutions explained cumulative variance 77.23%. The three factors captured represent 
political, regulatory and trade institutions. Property rights, investment freedom, financial 





List of Variable Dimensions, Scales and Sources 
 
Variable Dimensions Scale Source 
Property Rights 0-100 Index of Economic Freedom 
Business Freedom 0-100 Index of Economic Freedom 
Monetary Freedom 0-100 Index of Economic Freedom 
Trade Freedom 0-100 Index of Economic Freedom 
Investment Freedom 0-100 Index of Economic Freedom 
Financial Freedom 0-100 Index of Economic Freedom 
Investment Profile 0-12 Political Risk Index 
Democratic Accountability 0-6 Political Risk Index 
Corruption 0-6 Political Risk Index 
Bureaucracy Quality 0-4 Political Risk Index 
Intellectual Property Protection 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Judicial Independence  1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Burden of Government Regulations 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Efficacy of Legal Framework to Resolve 
Disputes 
1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Efficacy of Legal Framework to Challenge 
Regulations 
1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Infrastructure 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Health and Primary Education 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Higher Education and Training  1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Lending Interest rates 1-100 World Development Indicators  
Market Capitalization - World Development Indicators 
Stock Traded - World Development Indicators 
Efficiency of Corporate Boards 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Auditing and Reporting Standards 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Strength of Investor Protection 1-10 Global Competiveness Report 
Minority Shareholder Protection 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Ease of Access to Loans 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Soundness of Banks 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Regulation of Security Exchange 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Effectiveness of Antimonopoly Policies 1-7 Global Competiveness Report 
Note. 
Index of Economic Freedom is published by Heritage Foundation 
Political Risk Index is published by International Country Risk Guide 
Global Competiveness Report is published by World Economic Forum 




loaded heavily on the factor 1 representing political institutions. Bureaucratic quality had the 
lowest loading of 0.80 and property rights had the highest loading of 0.97 on political institutions 




Factor Analysis Results for Institutions  
 Factor  1- 
Political 
Institutions 






Property rights .967 .108 .282 
Business freedom .686 −.020 .665 
Monetary freedom .534 .309 .652 
Trade freedom .259 .063 .816 
Investment freedom  .910 −.024 .452 
Financial freedom .814 −.126 .465 
Investment profile .836 .057 .326 
Democratic accountability .901 −.020 −.045 
Corruption .803 .308 .189 
Bureaucracy quality .796 .194 .287 
Intellectual property protection .446 .725 .468 
Judicial Independence  .548 .727 .038 
Efficacy of legal framework to resolve 
disputes 
−.068 .898 .105 
Efficacy of legal framework to challenge 
regulations 
.028 .873 −.004 
Burden of government regulations −.383 .632 .404 
Eigen Value 7.030 3.122 1.441 
% Variance Explained 46.865 20.811 9.609 
Cumulative% Variance Explained 46.865 67.676 77.258 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.841 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 41254.54; p <0.01 
Note. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads 
 
Intellectual property protection, judicial independence, efficacy of legal framework to 
resolve disputes, efficacy of legal framework to challenge regulations loaded heavily on factor 2 
representing regulatory institutions. Intellectual property protection had the smallest loading of 
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0.73 and efficacy of legal framework to resolve disputes had the highest loading of 0.90. None of 
these factors presented any significant cross loadings and explained 20.81% of variance.  
Trade freedom alone loaded on factor 3 representing trade institutions and presented no 
significant cross loadings. Trade freedom had a loading of 0.82 and this factor explained 9.61% 
of variance.  
b. Factor Markets- Using Global Competiveness Report’s data a measure of factor 
markets was constructed based on three pillars that are Infrastructure, Health & Primary 
Education, and Higher Education & Training. This measure was constructed based on 2 pillar 
measure introduced by Hoskisson et al. (2013). However, a third pillar was included in addition 
the first two pillars used in the original measure. Each of these pillars were measured on a scale 
of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the lowest factor development, while 7 indicates the highest form of 
factor development. As reported in Table 11, EFA with oblique rotation resulted in a single 
factor solution with eigenvalue greater than 1. All components loaded on a single factor, 
explaining a total of 79.83% of variance. Health and primary education had the smallest loading 




Factor Analysis Results for Factor Markets 
 
 Factor 1: Factor Markets 
Infrastructure .919 
Health and primary education .847 
Higher education and training .912 
Eigen Value                 2.390 
% Variance Explained               79.825 
Cumulative% Variance Explained               79.825 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy =0.713 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 6805.75; p <0.001 
Note. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads 
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c. Capital market development - In order to measure the level of capital market 
development, twelve components were considered. These twelve components include lending 
interest, market capitalization, stock market turnover, efficacy of corporate boards, auditing and 
reporting standards, strength of investor protection, minority share holder protection, ease of 
access to loans, soundness of banks, regulation of security exchange and effectiveness of 
antimonopoly policies. Since higher interest rates are association with poorly developed capital 
markets, the lending interest rate component was reverse coded. Definitions, measurement scales 
and sources of data are provided in Table 9. As reported in Table 12, EFA with oblique rotation 
resulted in a three factor solution with eigenvalues greater than one. The three factor solution 
explained a cumulative variance of 82.48%.  
Table 12 
 
Factor Analysis Results for Capital Market Development  
 
 Factor  1- 
Capital Market 
Quality 






Lending Interest rates(Rev Code) −.095 .084 .970 
Z_ Market Capitalization −.298 .966 .084 
Z_ Stock traded −.198 .951 .057 
Efficacy of Corporate Boards .869 −.367 −.039 
Auditing and Reporting Standards .938 −.410 −.001 
Strength of investor protection .660 −.564 .241 
Minority shareholder protection .956 −.308 −.030 
Ease of access to loans .801 .067 .108 
Soundness of banks .847 −.383 −.174 
Regulation of security exchange .879 −.214 −.206 
Effectiveness of Antimonopoly policies .815 −.077 .048 
Eigen Value 6.112 1.881 1.080 
% Variance Explained 55.564 17.100 9.819 
Cumulative% Variance Explained 55.564 72.664 82.482 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.844 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 3657.772; p <0.001 




The efficacy of corporate boards, auditing and reporting standards, minority share holder 
protection, ease of access to loans, soundness of banks, regulation of security exchange, and 
effectiveness of antimonopoly policies loaded heavily on factor 1, which represents capital 
market quality. Ease of access to loans had the smallest loading of 0.80 and minority share 
holder protection had the highest loading. None of the components presented any significant 
cross loadings. Factor 1 i.e. capital market quality explained 55.56% of the variance.  
Market capitalization and stock traded loaded heavily on factor 2 representing capital 
market size. Stock traded had a loading of 0.95 and market capitalization had a loading of 0.97, 
and presenting no significant cross loadings. The Capital market size factor explained a variance 
of 17.10%. Lending interest rate had a loading of 0.97 on factor 3, representing the cost of 
capital, while explaining 9.82% of the variance.  
Control Variables. Several control variables were used in accordance to previous studies 
for the respective analysis.  
Acquirer public status is a dummy variable, where 1 was assigned if the acquiring firm is 
a publicly-traded firm, and 0 assigned if the acquiring firm is a privately held. The source of the 
data was SDC Platinum, and is a transaction-level variable.  
Target public status is a dummy variable, where 1 was assigned if the target firm is a 
publicly-traded firm, and 0 was assigned if the target firm is privately held. The source of the 
data was SDC Platinum and is a transaction-level variable.  
Deal value is a variable used to quantify the size of the acquisition measured in millions 
of US dollars. Size of the deal can have an impact on the acquisition behaviors of the acquirer, 
and also determines the risk involved in the given transaction. The source of the data was SDC 
Platinum and is a transaction-level variable.  
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Government involvement is a dummy variable that indicates whether the home or host 
country has a stake in either the target firm or the acquirer firm.  The source of the data was SDC 
Platinum and is a transaction-level variable.  
Friendly acquisition is a dummy variable which indicates that the acquirer made a 
friendly offer and reached an agreement with the target without any aggressive maneuvers. 
Existing research suggests that deal attitude has a significant influence on the outcome of the 
transaction, and future of the target firm. 0 was assigned if the acquisition was not friendly and 1 
was assigned if the focal acquisition was friendly. The source of the data was SDC Platinum and 
is a transaction level variable.  
Hostile acquisition is a dummy variable which indicates that the target was a subject of 
hostile takeover attempts by the acquirer. 0 was assigned if the acquisition was not hostile and 1 
was assigned if the focal acquisition was hostile. The source of the data was SDC Platinum and 
is a transaction level variable.  
Acquirer size is a variable used to quantify the value of the acquiring firm in millions of 
US dollars. The value of the acquirer’s current assets was used as a proxy for acquirer size. 
Acquirer current assets includes cash and other assets that will be turned into cash within one 
year, which includes cash, marketable securities, accounts receivable, inventories, and prepaid 
expenses. The source of the data was SDC Platinum and is a transaction-level variable.  
Acquirer cash is a variable indicating the value of cash and temporary investments for 
cash held by the acquirer (most current financial information) at the time of the announcement 
reported in millions of US dollars. The source of the data was SDC platinum and is a transaction-
level variable.  
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Joint Venture is a dummy variable indicating if the acquired organization was a joint 
venture between the acquiring and the selling firm. A value of 0 was assigned if the target was 
not a joint venture and 1 was assigned if the target firm was a joint venture. 
Number of bidders is an ordinal variable indicating the number of entities bidding for the 
target during the focal transaction. The source of the data was SDC Platinum and is a 
transaction-level variable.  
Deal challenged is a dummy variable which indicates if a third party launched an offer 
for the target while the original bid was pending. A value of 0 was assigned if the deal was not 
challenged and 1 was assigned if the deal was challenged. The source of the data was SDC 
platinum and is a transaction-level variable.  
Acquirer Industry was determined based on the 2 digit SIC (standard industrial 
classification) code. Industries included in the analysis were construction, finance and insurance, 
manufacturing, mining, services, retail and wholesale trade, transport and public administration. 
Dummy variables were created for each of the industries except public administration, which 
was left as a reference industry. The public administration industry had the lowest number of 
transactions within the industry, therefore this industry was used as reference.  
Year of announcement is a dummy variable created to avoid unobserved omitted 
variable bias. Nine year dummies were created for years 2006-2014, leaving 2015 as a reference 
year.  
Statistical Analysis 
To test the hypothesized relationship between determinants of home country environment 
and equity sought, linear regression was used. Though the data is nested, interclass correlations 
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were close to zero making linear regression the desirable method of analysis. This analysis was 
used to test Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c, 8, 11a, 11b, and 11c.  
To test the hypothesized relationship between determinants of the home country 
environment and acquisition premium, 2 level (transaction and country level) multilevel linear 
regressions was used. The interclass correlations were 0.42, which suggested that meaningful 
results can be obtained by performing a multilevel regression. This analysis was used to test 
Hypotheses 6a, 6b, 6c, 9, 12a, 12b, and 12c. 
Finally, to test for the hypothesized relationship between determinants of home country 
environment and the method of payment, 2 level (multilevel) binary logistic regressions were 
used owing to the dichotomous dependent variable and nested data. With the presented an inter 
class correlation of 0.50, it is suggested that meaningful results can be obtained by performing a 
multilevel binary logistic regression. This analysis will test for hypotheses 7a, 7b, 7c, 10, 13a, 






Table 13 presents descriptive statistics and the bivariate correlations for the entire series 
of dependent, independent and control variables used to test hypothesis 5a to 13c. All 
correlations were below the standard cutoff limit of 0.70. Though below the cutoff limit, high 
correlations were observed between political institutions and capital market size (r = −0.62), and 
between acquirer public service and acquirer cash (r = −0.64). No multicollinearity was 




Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
 
S.no  Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 ES 64.57 37.40         
2 AP - -   .31
**
        




       
4 PI .01     .88   .08
**




      
5 RI 4.07     .67   .08
**
   .06
**
 −.03   .39
**
     
6 TI 72.67 10.17 −.03
*
   .01 −.02   .34
**
   .11
**
    
7 FM 4.93 4.93 −.07
**
   .04
**
   .04
**
   .39
**
   .21
**
   .42
**
   
8 CMQ 4.52 4.52   .10
**
   .05
**
 −.02   .43
**
   .15
**
   .09
**
   .01  















10 CoC 42.45 6.19 −.07
**
 −.01   .06
**
 −.00   .17
**
   .22
**
   .41 −.13
**
 
11 APS - -   .13
**




   .18
**




   .13   .15
**
 



















   .03 −.00
**
 −.03   .01 −.01 −.03 











15 Friendly - -   .18
**




   .03
*




   .01    .03 




   .08
**
 −.02 −.02   .00 −.03 −.00 








   .03   .02 −.12
**
 
18 AS 11891.13 92606.49 −.05
**




























 −.02 −.05 −.02 
Note. 
ES: Equity Sought     APS: Acquirer Public Status 
AP: Acquisition Premium    TPS: Target Public Status 
CP: Contingent Payment    DV: Deal Value 
PI: Political Institutions    GI: Government Involvement  
RI: Regulatory Institutions    AC: Acquirer Cash 
TI: Trade Institutions     AS: Acquirer Size 
**
p < 0.01. 
*




Table 13 (Continued) 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations 
 
S.no  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
10 CoC   .22
**










         
13 DV   .01 −.11
**
   .02   .07
**
        
14 GI   .09
**




   .11
**
   .08
**
       






 −.01      
16 Hostile   .02 −.04
*
   .02   .13
**




     
17 AC   .06
**
   .00 −.64
**
   .19
**




   .00    
18 AS   .00 −.02   .03
*
   .07
**
   .02   .05
**
 −.01 −.00 .14
**
   




   .12
**
   .19
**






 .02 −.00  




   .13
**
   .21
**











FM: Factor Markets     NoB: Number of Bidders 
CMQ: Capital Market Quality   DC: Deal Challenged 
CMS: Capital Market Size    CoC: Cost of Capital 
**
p < 0.01. 
*
p < 0.05 
The results of the regression analysis performed to test for the hypothesized relationship 
between home country environment and equity sought are presented in Table 14. Model 1 
represents the regression equation with control variables including year and acquirer industry 
dummies. Model 1 alone explains 15% of the variance in equity sought. Year 2011 (b = 6.02, 
p<0.05), year 2013 (b = −6.63, p<0.05), construction (b = −33.76, p<0.01), finance (b = 
−27.61, p<0.05), manufacturing (b = −22.18, p<0.05), mining (b = −29.37, p<0.05), services 
(b = 19.99, p<0.05), trade (b = −22.89, p<0.05), transport (b = 29.82, p<0.01), investor group 
(b = −32.59, p<0.01), target public status(b = −24.63, p<0.05), hostile acquisitions(b = 33.17, 
p<0.01), deal size(β = 0.00, p<0.05), and acquirer size (β = −0.00, p<0.05) were significant.  
Model 2 tests for the role of country’s institutions on equity sought. In Model 2, political 
institutions, regulatory institutions, and trade institutions were entered into the regression 
equation in addition to the control variables listed in Model 1. Model 2 explains 16% of the 
variance (adj- R
2 





 Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Equity Sought  
 
 Variables Model 1 Model 2 
  b (s. e.) b (s. e.) 
Controls Constant 99.68 (2.49) 100.67 (10.65) 
 Year 2006 Dummy .64 (2.27) −2.12 (2.60) 
 Year 2007 Dummy 6.48 (2.22) 4.73 (2.37) 
 Year 2008 Dummy 5.32 (2.54) 3.65 (2.29) 
 Year 2009 Dummy 2.52 (2.33) 1.54 (2.54) 
 Year 2010 Dummy 3.32 (2.33) 2.67 (2.35) 





 Year 2012 Dummy −.13 (2.52) −.67 (2.11) 





 Year 2014 Dummy −2.65 (9.86) −2.80 (2.34) 








































 Acquirer Public Status −1.13 (1.36) −1.88 (1.64) 





 Govt. Involvement −6.33 (3.58) −5.61 (2.16) 










 Acquirer Cash −.00 (.00) −.00 (.00) 





Independent    
 Political Institutions  1.56
*
 (.83) 
 Regulatory Institutions  2.06
*
 (1.01) 
 Trade Institutions   −.13
†
(.06) 
 Factor Markets   
 Capital Market Quality   
 Capital Market Size   
 Cost of Capital   


















Table 14 (Continued) 
 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Equity Sought  
 
 Variables Model 3 Model 4 
  b (s. e.) b (s. e.) 
Controls Constant 130.81 (11.12) 128.74  (14.26) 
 Year 2006 Dummy −3.28 (2.64) −1.63 (2.96) 
 Year 2007 Dummy 1.95 (2.36) 3.25 (2.74) 
 Year 2008 Dummy .65 (2.31) 1.99 (2.79) 
 Year 2009 Dummy −1.20 (2.57) .06 (2.76) 
 Year 2010 Dummy 1.31 (2.33) 2.55 (2.68) 





 Year 2012 Dummy −.94 (2.08) .47 (2.51) 





 Year 2014 Dummy −2.18 (2.34) −1.21 (2.44) 








































 Acquirer Public Status −1.79 (1.66) −1.88 (1.65) 





 Govt. Involvement −4.06 (2.24) −3.81
†
 (2.27) 










 Acquirer Cash −.00 (.00) −.00 (.00) 





Independent    





 Regulatory Institutions 2.79
**
 (1.03) 1.76 (2.04) 
 Trade Institutions  .00 (.06) .00 (.06) 





 Capital Market Quality  1.43 (2.54) 
 Capital Market Size  1.03 (1.14) 
 Cost of Capital  -.06 (.12) 

















(b = 2.06, p<0.05) where both positive and significant, lending support to Hypotheses 5a and 5b. 
Trade institutions (b = −0.13, p<0.10) had a negative and significant effect which failed to 
support the hypothesized relationship in Hypothesis 5c. 
Model 3 tests for the role of the home country’s factor market endowment and explains 
17% of the variance. Though factor markets (b = −8.93, p<0.01) had a significant effect, it was 
negative which is different from the hypothesized relationship in Hypothesis 8. Model 4 tests for 
the role of the home country’s capital market development explaining 18% (adj. R
2 
= 0.18) of 
the variance. All three components, capital market quality (b = 1.43, p>0.05), capital market 
size (b = 1.03, p>0.05) and cost of capital (b = −0.06, p>0.05) were insignificant.  
Results of the 2 level HLM analysis performed to test for the hypothesized relationship 
between home country environment and acquisition premium are presented in Table 15. Model 1 
tests for the effects of transaction level control variables along with industry and year dummies. 
In Model 1, year 2006 (b = −0.01, p<0.01), 2007(b = 0.25, p<0.05), 2008 (b = 0.11, p<0.05), 
2009 (b = 0.15, p<0.05) and 2010 (b = 0.15, p<0.01) had significant effects. Acquirer public 
status (b = 0.11, p<0.01) was positive and significant, while target public status (b = −1.12, 
p<0.01) was negative and significant. Number of bidders (b = −0.42, p<.0.01), deal value (b = 
−0.00, p<0.05) and hostile acquisitions (b = −0.75, p<0.01) had negative and significant effects, 
while equity sought (b = 0.00, p<0.01), acquirer cash (b = 0 .00, p<0.01), and acquirer size (b 
= 0.00, p<0.01) had positive and significant effects.  
Model 2 tested for the effects of country-level institutional variables, namely political, 
regulatory and trade institutions. Political (b = 0.11, p<0.05) and regulatory (b = 0.04, p<0.10) 
institutions had positive and significant effect as hypothesized and lending support to Hypotheses 






Results of HLM Analysis of Acquisition Premium   
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  b (s.e.) b (s.e.) 


























 2011(β06j) .20 (.06) .16 (.05) 
 2012(β07j) .08 (.05) .04 (.05) 
 2013(β08j) −.00 (.06) −.03 (.06) 
 2014(β09j) .01 (.06) −.03 (.06) 
 2015(β10j) −.31 (.41) −.33 (.42) 
 Construction Ind. (β11j) −.48 (.39) −.53 (.39) 
 Finance Ind. (β12j) −.43 (.39) −.46 (.39) 
 Investor Group (β13j) .40 (.38) −.43 (.39) 
 Manufacturing Ind(β14j) −.55 (.39) −.58 (.39) 
 Services Ind(β15j) −.40 (.39) −.44 (.39) 
 Trade Ind (β16j) −.42 (.39) −.45 (.39) 
 Transport Ind(β17j) −.41 (.39) −.45 (.39) 















 Govt Invl(β21j) .04 (.04) .09 (.11) 





 Friendly(β23j) .01 (.05) .01 (.05) 

























Country level Pol Inst. (γ01j)  .11
*
 (.02) 
 Regul Inst. (γ02j)  .04
†
 (.02) 
 Trade Inst. (γ03j)  −.00 (.00) 
 Factor Market(γ04j)   
 Cap Mkt Quality(γ05j)   
 Cap. Mkt Size(γ06j)   


















Table 15 (Continued)  
 
Results of HLM Analysis of Acquisition Premium   
 
  Model 3 Model 4 
  b (s.e.) b (s.e.) 


























 2011(β06j) .16 (.05) .31 (.13) 
 2012(β07j) .04 (.05) .18 (.13) 
 2013(β08j) −.03 (.06) .13 (.14) 
 2014(β09j) −.02 (.05) .19 (.14) 
 2015(β10j) −.33 (.41) −.42 (.48) 
 Construction Ind. (β11j) −.52 (.38) −.69 (.45) 
 Finance Ind. (β12j) −.45 (.38) −.59 (.45) 
 Investor Group (β13j) −.43 (.38) −.57 (.45) 
 Manufacturing Ind(β14j) −.58 (.38) −.71 (.45) 
 Services Ind(β15j) −.44 (.38) −.58 (.45) 
 Trade Ind (β16j) −.45 (.39) −.63 (.46) 
 Transport Ind(β17j) −.45 (.39) −.61 (.45) 















 Govt Invl(β21j) .09 (.04) .09 (.05) 




































 Regul Inst. (γ02j) .04
†
  (.02) .09
†
  (.06) 
 Trade Inst. (γ03j) −.00 (.00) −.00 (.00) 
 Factor Market(γ04j) −.01 (.03) −.05 (.04) 
 Cap Mkt Quality(γ05j)  −.18
*
 (.08) 
 Cap. Mkt Size(γ06j)  −.11
†
 (.06) 














p<0.10.  n = 4161 
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therefore, Hypothesis 6c was not supported. Similarly Model 3 tested for the effects of country 
level factor markets (b = −0.01, p>.05), which while negative, was not significant, therefore, 
Hypothesis 9 was not supported. 
Model 4 tested for the effects of the country level variables of the capital market 
development dimensions, namely capital market quality, capital market size and cost of capital. 
Capital market quality (b = −0.18, p<0.05) and capital market size (b = −0.11, p<0.10) had 
negative and significant effects as hypothesized, lending support to Hypotheses 12a and 12b. 
Cost of capital (b = 0.00, p>0.05) while negative, was not significant; therefore, Hypothesis 12c 
was not supported.  
Results of the (2 level) multilevel logistic regression analysis performed to test for the 
hypothesized relationship between the home country environment and the method of payment are 
presented in Table 16. Model 1 reports on the effects of transaction level (level 1) control 
variables, year and industry dummies. Years 2006 (b = 0.66, p<0.10), 2011(b = 0.79, p<0.05), 
2012 (b = 0.72, p<0.05), 2013(b = 0.66, p<0.05), and 2014 (b = 0.89, p<0.05) had positive and 
significant effects on contingent method of payment. Target public status (b = 0.73, p<0.01) and 
number of bidders (b = 0.79, p<0.01) had positive and significant effects, while government 
involvement (b = −0.36, p<0.01), friendly acquisitions (b = −0.22, p<0.05), equity sought (b = 
−0.00, p<0.10), and deal value (b = −0.00, p<0.10) had negative and significant effects.  
Model 2 presents the effects of country level (level 2) institutional variables, namely 
political, regulatory and trade institutions, which were not significant. Therefore, hypotheses 7a, 
7b and 7c were not supported. Similarly, Model 3 presents the effects of factor markets which 







Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis of Contingent Method of Payment   
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  b (s.e.) b (s.e.) 






Transaction level 2007(β02j) .33 (.14) .29 (.14) 
Level 1 2008(β03j) .25 (.14) .22 (.14) 
 2009(β04j) .41 (.15) .39 (.15) 





















 2015(β10j) .19 (1.20) .23(1.20) 
 Construction Ind. (β11j) .66 (1.15) .68(1.15) 
 Finance Ind. (β12j) .78 (1.15) .79(1.15) 
 Investor Group (β13j) .70 (1.15) .72(1.15) 
 Manufacturing Ind(β14j) .68 (1.15) .69(1.15) 
 Services Ind(β15j) .54 (1.15) .55(1.15) 
 Trade Ind (β16j) .55 (1.16) .57(1.16) 
 Transport Ind(β17j) .49 (1.15) .50(1.15) 
 Acq Public(β18j) −.02 (.09) −.02(.09) 










 No. of Bidders(β21j) .79
**






 Hostile(β23j) .74 (.41) .74(.41) 










 Acq. Cash(β26j) −.00 (.00) −.00(.00) 
 Acq. Size(β27j) −.00 (.00) −.00(.00) 
Independent Pol Inst. (γ01j)  −.11(.11) 
Country level Regul Inst. (γ02j)  −.03(.08) 
Level 2 Trade Inst. (γ03j)  −.01(.00) 
 Factor Market(γ04j)   
 Cap Mkt Quality(γ05j)   
 Cap. Mkt Size(γ06j)   















p<0.10 . n = 4161  
79 
 
Table 16 (Continued) 
 
Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis of Contingent Method of Payment 
   
  Model 3 Model 4 
  b (s.e.) b (s.e.) 






Transaction level 2007(β02j) .31 (.15) .44 (.35) 
Level 1 2008(β03j) .23 (.16) .24 (.35) 
 2009(β04j) .41 (.16) .50 (.35) 





















 2015(β10j) .23 (1.20) .07 (1.24) 
 Construction Ind. (β11j) .68 (1.15) .39 (1.18) 
 Finance Ind. (β12j) .79 (1.15) .52 (1.18) 
 Investor Group (β13j) .72 (1.15) .52 (1.18) 
 Manufacturing Ind(β14j) .69 (1.15) .54 (1.18) 
 Services Ind(β15j) .55 (1.15) .38 (1.18) 
 Trade Ind (β16j) .57 (1.16) .49 (1.19) 
 Transport Ind(β17j) .50 (1.15) .36 (1.18) 
 Acq Public(β18j) −.02 (.09) −.07 (.11) 


















 Hostile(β23j) .74 (.41) .71 (.47) 









  (.00) 
 Acq. Cash(β26j) −.00 (.00) −.00 (.00) 
 Acq. Size(β27j) −.00 (.00) −.00 (.00) 
Independent Pol Inst. (γ01j) −.11 (.11) −.13 (.12) 
Country level Regul Inst. (γ02j) −.03 (.09) −.38 (.19) 
Level 2 Trade Inst. (γ03j) −.01 (.00) −.01 (.00) 
 Factor Market(γ04j) .03 (.16) .28 (.19) 
 Cap Mkt Quality(γ05j)  .43
*
 (.21) 
 Cap. Mkt Size(γ06j)  −.12 (.19) 





















Model 4 presents the effects of capital market development via its three components. 
Capital market quality had a positive and significant effect, while capital market size was not 
significant. Finally, the cost of capital had a positive and significant effect as hypothesized. 






Emerging markets and emerging market firms (EMFs) have progressed greatly since the 
inception of the emerging market concept. Both play a prominent role in today’s global economy 
and are challenging the status quo of dominant market players from advanced markets. The 
growing standing of emerging markets and EMFs are not only challenging other market players, 
but are also challenging the theoretical understanding of firm behavior with respect to 
internationalization. In an attempt to enhance the understanding of EMF behavior, IB researchers 
took distinct approaches, like attempting to explain EMF behavior using existing theories, 
proposing new theories or by amending existing theories to apply to a broader set of firms. In 
doing so, researchers (except a few: e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2000, 2013) have created a 
dichotomous division between EMFs and AMFs, where there is an underlying treatment of 
homogeneity in the behavior of EMFs.  
In this dissertation I argued that emerging markets are far from homogenous. In fact, 
EMFs are heterogeneous at the very least because of the effects of heterogeneous home country 
institutions and resource environments. Hence, current research that focuses primarily on the 
behavior of EMFs from a few countries such as China and South Korea (Kim, Hoskisson, & Lee, 
2015; Mathews, 2006) cannot be generalized to all EMFs. I also demonstrate that the distinct 
behavior of EMFs can be better understood by focusing on the country of origin and those 
countries’ respective institutional and resource configurations. The institution and resources 
create the context from which EMFs are motivated to internationalize. In doing so, this two-part 
study integrates the ‘OLI paradigm’ with the three specialized theoretical strands (the escape 
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motivation, non-market capabilities and strategic asset seeking views) built on the home 
country’s institutional and resource environments.  
The findings in this dissertation underscore the role of the home country influence by 
emphasizing the importance of a country’s institutional and resource environments. A framework 
(presented in Figure 3) to interpret EMF behavior as a function of home country influence was 
created in this dissertation which identifies home country institutions as a source of motivation 
for internationalization. The framework also presents factor market development as a source of 
EMF capabilities to capitalize and accrue the benefits of internationalization to advanced 
markets. Additionally, it also finds that home country capital markets are indicators of a 
country’s capacity to export capital. Finally, technological readiness is also an indicator of 
emerging markets’ and EMFs’ adaptability to advanced market technologies.  
 
 
Figure 3. Conceptual Framework to Understand Home Country Influence 
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By focusing on a broader set of emerging markets, the analysis of OFDI scale directed 
from emerging markets to advanced markets provides evidence suggesting that institutional and 
resource environments have significant effects on EMF internationalization trajectories. The 
findings suggest that the qualities of emerging market political institutions, factor markets, 
technological readiness, and capital market size act as facilitators to drive FDI towards advanced 
markets. However, the development of economic institutions curbs or constrains the flow of 
OFDI towards advanced markets. This constraining finding was contrary to the hypothesized 
relationship and cannot be explained at this time. Therefore, future research should be directed 
towards advancing our understudying the differentiated and complex nature of institutions.  
Results further suggest that development in emerging market home country institutional 
and resource environments play a critical role in determining the firm level strategies in cross 
border acquisitions into advanced markets. Evidence from the analysis suggests that growing 
institutional quality in home countries will drive EMFs to pursue larger equity stakes and greater 
control of targets in advanced markets. However, home country factor market development 
works to the contrary. Evidence suggests that increases in home factor market development 
drives EMFs to pursue smaller equity stakes, and favor partial acquisitions over full acquisitions. 
This may be understood as the concept that EMFs with well-endowed factor markets at home are 
capable of benefitting from partial acquisitions. In short, the EMFs in such conditions are also 
capable of sourcing capabilities from the target firm even when the acquirer does not assume 
100% equity. Similarly, EMFs are motivated by the added value an AMF acquisition can create 
to their own firm. Given the home country institutional environment, EMFs are willing to pay 
higher premiums to acquire advanced market targets. In addition, these results also suggest that 
as the home country capital markets develop, the ability of EMFs to pay higher premiums 
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decreases due to increases in shareholder protection and other regulatory constraints that are 
placed on the firms in the home country. Also, the tendency to use contingent methods of 
payment also increases with development of home country capital markets largely due to a 
decrease in tolerance for risk and greater acceptability of the acquirer stock by the target firm.  
Conclusion and Contributions 
The findings of this dissertation are to be interpreted as follows. First, with the 
development of the home country institutional environment, EMFs are motivated to shift their 
focus from non-market capabilities to market capabilities and to acquire and internalize market 
capabilities. When this occurs, EMFs are motivated to internationalize to advanced markets to 
augment strategic assets that they traditionally lack. Thus, home country institutional 
development acts as a motivator in driving EMF investments to advanced markets in pursuit of 
market capabilities.   
Second, EMFs should have sufficient home country advantage with resource munificence 
in form of factor market development and technological readiness, where factor markets 
determines their capability to internalize advanced market firm capabilities with ease and the 
technological readiness determines the adaptability of EMFs to advanced market technological 
capabilities and internalize them.  
Finally, the capital market development determines the capacity of emerging markets and 
respective emerging market firms to export capital. The capacity to export capital, in turn, 
determines their ability to pursue asset augmentation through advanced market internalization.  
All in all, EMFs are subjects of their home country institutional and resource environment, and 




This dissertation also contributes to international business and strategy literature in 
several ways. First, this dissertation made an attempt to integrate existing theoretical strands 
(non-market capabilities, resource seeking perspective, and refuge seeking perspectives) that 
emerged to explain behaviors of EMFs. Though these theoretical strands are important tools to 
understand a subset of EMFs, they cannot explain the behavior of most EMFs. In order to have a 
holistic framework that explains the behavior of most EMFs, an attempt was made to integrate 
all three strands with the OLI paradigm, which helps to explain the behavior of most firms. 
Second, in order to make the framework more effective in understanding EMF 
internationalization, differences among emerging markets were highlighted in the form of 
institutional and resource heterogeneity. As a first step towards developing the integrated 
framework, this dissertation studies the influence of home country environment. Finally, this 
dissertation contributes by providing empirical evidence highlighting the influence of home 
country institutional and resource environment on international trajectories and 
internationalization behaviors of EMFs.  
Implications 
The findings of this dissertation have several research and practical implications. First, 
current research of emerging markets and EMFs which assume the generalizability of findings 
from a few emerging markets to all EMFs is very problematic. Findings from this dissertation 
imply that the heterogeneity in emerging markets’ institutional and resource environment have 
important implications on EMF behaviors. These findings are consistent with limited research in 
this area (Hoskisson et al., 2013; Kedia, Reddy, & Bilgili, 2015; Wan, 2005). Second, the 
findings of this dissertation imply that much EMF behavior can be greatly understood by country 
of origin effects, also reinforcing findings in earlier research (Luo & Wang, 2012). Third, the 
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disparity in the value created by the advanced markets acquisitions for AMFs and EMFs can 
explain the reluctance of AMFs to bid higher and conversely, the willingness of EMFs to bid 
higher than AMFs. The failure of AMFs to successfully restrict EMFs from acquiring firms in 
advanced markets will cost AMFs in two fronts. First, granting access to traditional ownership 
advantages via advanced market acquisitions will undermine the strategic advantages that AMFs 
have over EMFs in both advanced markets and emerging markets. Second, advanced markets 
acquisitions also grant market access to EMFs which will allow the EMFs to effectively compete 
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